

# **NAVIGATING ETHNIC FRICTIONS: A CASE STUDY ON THE POSSIBLE RISK OF IMMIGRATION-RELATED CONFLICT IN ESTONIAN MUNICIPALITIES IN 2014–2018**

**Helina Maasing, MSc**  
*University of Tartu  
Institute of Social Studies  
PhD student  
Estonia*

**Oliver Nahkur, PhD**  
*University of Tartu  
Institute of Social Studies  
Research fellow  
Estonia*

**Ave Roots, PhD**  
*University of Tartu  
Institute of Social Studies  
Research fellow, lecturer  
Estonia*

**Mare Ainsaar, PhD**  
*University of Tartu  
Institute of Social Studies  
Senior research fellow  
Estonia*

**Keywords:** immigration, conflict risk, European Social Survey, composite index, Estonian municipalities

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15158/efk3-mc48>

## ABSTRACT

This study provides insights into measuring immigration-related conflict risk in diverse societies, using Estonia as a case study. Employing the Measuring Immigration-Related Conflict Risk Index (MICRI), which is designed to measure this type of risk, the study analyses risk scores for 75 Estonian municipalities. Additionally, cluster analysis is used to characterise various risk typologies within these municipalities.

The findings indicate an overall low level of immigration-related risk in Estonia (6.53 on average), with specific municipalities showing heightened risk levels due to factors such as significant immigrant influx and discrimination. Approximately one-third of the municipalities fall into higher risk categories. These municipalities experience notable immigration levels and already host multiple ethnic groups, often reporting instances of discrimination, perceived injustice and economic disparities. Regionally, all municipalities in north-eastern Estonia fall into the highest risk groups, reflecting the long-standing grievances of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. Most municipalities show lower risk levels due to ethnic homogeneity and minimal immigrant influx, although attitudes towards immigrants vary.

Despite the overall low risk levels, critical risk factors persist in Estonian society. Understanding these vulnerabilities is crucial for informed policymaking to foster peaceful coexistence and promote positive interactions between ethnic groups. Therefore, this study serves as a valuable monitoring tool for policymakers and security analysts, aiding in the early identification of potential tensions at the sub-national level.

## INTRODUCTION

In many nations, ethnic diversity is on the rise primarily due to significant increases in immigration. However, this growing diversity also brings the challenge of potential intergroup tensions, a phenomenon that is not unfamiliar in European and Baltic societies. Studies have shown that immigration and ethnic diversity can diminish social solidarity and generate negative attitudes toward immigrants (Karreth et al., 2015; Putnam, 2007). Building upon this understanding, this study aims to measure the potential conflict risk arising from immigration within society, using Estonia as a case study. Our focus is on understanding the risk level and its contributing factors at the municipality level to support policymakers in adjusting their strategies based on local vulnerabilities.

*Immigration-related ethnic conflicts* can be defined as tensions that arise from the complex interplay between immigration processes and pre-existing ethnic divisions within societies (Enos, 2014; Dancygier & Laitin, 2014; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). These tensions typically manifest between newcomers from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds and the established population, encompassing issues from discrimination to violence.

Within this context, Estonia, a small nation with a complex historical backdrop and rapidly evolving demographics, stands as a compelling case study. Estonia already experienced significant shifts during the Soviet occupation, when the proportion of ethnic Estonians fell from 88% in 1940 to 62% in 1989 (Tiit, 2011, pp. 59–60). Thus, by the time Estonia regained its independence in 1991, over a third of the population was a Russian-speaking minority, mainly Russians (30.3%) and Ukrainians (3.1%) (Tiit 2011, p. 61). While the share of Russians has since decreased to 23.7% as of 2021 (Statistics Estonia, 2021), the war in Ukraine has led to a tenfold increase in the number of Ukrainians residing in Estonia (Arenguseire Keskus, 2023). Over the years, Estonia has increasingly become an attractive destination for immigrants, both from the former Soviet bloc and beyond (Anniste, 2018, pp. 27–28).

Another important aspect of Estonia's demographic landscape is its ethnic segregation. The country is divided into 79 municipalities. Almost half of the Russian-speaking population lives in a linguistically

homogenous (Russian-speaking) region in the north-east of Estonia. For example, the 2021 census revealed that in Narva, a city near the Russian border, ethnic Estonians make up just 5% of the population, with the majority identifying as Russians. In the capital, Tallinn, approximately 53% of the population is of ethnic Estonian descent (Statistics Estonia, 2021).

According to *conflict theory*, conflicts are more likely to emerge when two roughly equal-sized groups with opposing goals coexist (Horowitz, 1985). Following this perspective, the risk of conflict exists mainly between ethnic Estonians and Russians, the two major groups represented in Estonia. However, in light of Estonia's evolving status as a destination for immigrants from various nations, including beyond the former Soviet bloc, it becomes imperative to assess potential threats to social cohesion.

Therefore, this research investigates the following questions:

1. What is the risk level of immigration-related ethnic conflicts in Estonian municipalities?
2. How do different municipalities in Estonia vary in terms of risk factors?

To answer these questions, we analysed a sample of 75 out of 79 Estonian municipalities.<sup>1</sup> We then assessed their potential risk of immigration-related conflicts using the Measuring Immigration-Related Conflict Risk Index (MICRI) (Maasing et al., 2021), which is specifically designed to measure risk at the sub-national level, capturing regional differences. Given that tensions usually begin at the local level, predicting conflict risk by looking at national data is not sufficiently precise (Halkia et al., 2020). Unlike most other available indexes that measure anti-immigration attitudes (Marozzi, 2016; Hellmann et al., 2022) or conflict risks (Halkia et al., 2020; Hegre et al., 2019) at the national level, often using macro-level data, the MICRI index includes subjective indicators characterising groups' grievances. Based on the MICRI scores, municipalities were clustered into groups to describe their dominant risk factors.

---

<sup>1</sup> Four municipalities were left out of the sample because not enough data was available for them.

The data used for the MICRI index was drawn from the European Social Survey (ESS), specifically from three rounds (2014, 2016 and 2018), which gave us a sufficient sample size for analysis. Data on the municipalities' ethnic composition and immigration flows was taken from the 2021 national census.

The article begins with a theoretical exploration of the sources of immigration-related ethnic conflicts, followed by an overview of potential conflict factors within Estonian society. The third section outlines the data sources and methodology used to calculate the scores for the MICRI index, followed by its application to Estonian municipalities and the delineation of municipality typologies. The article concludes by summarising key findings and offering insights into the broader implications of the study's results.

## **1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION-RELATED ETHNIC CONFLICTS**

In the academic field, there is broad consensus that no single factor or theory explains the origins of rebellion. Theoretical frameworks for understanding immigration-related ethnic conflicts often draw on *social identity theory*, Allport's (1958) *contact hypothesis* and *relative deprivation theory*. Social identity encompasses an individual's self-concept derived from their awareness of belonging to one or more social groups, alongside the significance and emotional value attached to this membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Ethnicity, religion or immigration status may be the identity markers that individuals use to categorise group memberships. The ethnic or social identities of immigrants develop through their interactions with members of the host community (contact theory). Positive interactions encourage assimilation or integration, whereas negative interactions can lead to feelings of marginalisation, increased prejudice or racialised identities that are associated with ethnic segregation and intergroup conflict (Schimmele & Wu, 2015; Allport, 1958).

Usually, individuals tend to perceive their group as superior or more favourable than out-groups, a phenomenon that contributes to the "us

v. them” mentality frequently observed in intergroup conflicts. When this mindset is combined with competition for limited resources, such as jobs, housing, social services and political representation, it can cause tensions between groups (Jo & Choi, 2019; Kern Marien & Hooghe, 2015). This concept draws from relative deprivation theory (Adams, 1965), which suggests that feelings of frustration and discontent arise when individuals perceive that their circumstances are worse than those of other similar individuals or when they experience a discrepancy between their expectations and actual outcomes (Schulze & Krätschmer-Hahn, 2014). Conflict becomes particularly likely in situations where resources are insufficient to meet everyone’s needs, leading one group to view the presence of another as a threat to their way of life and security (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998; Glas, Jennissen & Engbersen, 2021). Indeed, negative attitudes towards immigrants tend to rise in adverse economic situations. Isaksen’s (2019) analysis reveals that poor economic performance in Europe during the 2007–2008 financial crisis correlated with a rise in pessimistic attitudes towards immigrants. Similar findings were reported by the International Organization for Migration (IMO, 2010), suggesting that perceptions of immigrants’ impact on the economy tend to become more negative as unemployment rises.

Importantly, immigration-related conflicts are not solely a result of immigration but are often associated with abrupt shifts in population size, exacerbated by disparities in group size (Jakobsen et al., 2016; Costalli & Moro, 2011; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Hopkins (2010) introduced another factor into this equation: for an influx of immigrants to provoke increased hostility from natives, immigration must first become politically salient at the national level. When both these conditions – political salience and rapid immigration – are met, hostility towards immigrants is more likely to emerge.

Furthermore, the mobilisation of different groups often involves actors seeking specific objectives. Horowitz (1985) argues that conflicts frequently arise as deliberate political strategies used by leaders and groups to further their interests. Thus, conflicts are not solely the outcome of deep-rooted grievances but also calculated decisions by actors to mobilise groups in support of their interests. Historically, immigration has been strategically used to alter a country’s population composition and, consequently, influence its policy or security (Bachmann & Paphiti,

2021, p. 120). Greenhill (2010, p. 117) has identified 56 instances where immigrants were used as “weapons” to exert influence over other countries’ policies. For example, Russia leveraged this approach in the lead-up to its occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, by facilitating the acquisition of Russian citizenship for Ukrainian citizens primarily as a means to influence and destabilise Ukrainian society, ultimately culminating in territorial occupations (Gridina & Kasyanova, 2019, p. 36). Similarly, Juurvee and Mattiisen (2020) argue that the ethnic composition resulting from the occupation of Estonia played a pivotal role in the outbreak of the Bronze Night riots in Estonia in 2007.

In summary, these theoretical perspectives are not isolated; rather, they interact in complex ways to shape the dynamics of conflicts. Social identity theory sheds light on the psychological foundations of intergroup biases and perceptions (group identities, interpersonal trust deficits and disparities in fundamental values), while relative deprivation theory provides insight into the socio-economic factors driving these tensions (competition for resources). Furthermore, political strategies provide a framework for understanding how power dynamics influence the manifestation of conflicts. Specifically, when minority groups, especially those with unresolved grievances, attain a significant demographic presence, the potential for their mobilisation in conflicts becomes more pronounced.

## **2. PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS OF IMMIGRATION-RELATED ETHNIC CONFLICT IN ESTONIA**

According to conventional wisdom, Estonia would have been a likely candidate for ethnic turmoil after regaining its independence in the early 1990s. The country’s ethno-demographic composition was such that some leading experts in ethnic conflict have regarded it as a high-risk environment. The titular ethnic group – Estonians – represented just over half of the population, while the remainder belonged to another distinct linguistic and cultural community (Kolstø, 2002). In such bicultural and bipolar societies, according to Donald Horowitz (1985), ethnic peace tends to be unstable.

In the 1990s, Estonia's ethnopolitical landscape indeed exhibited pronounced conflictual elements (Kolstø, 2002, p. 4), including an attack on the parliament building in the spring of 1990 and an autonomy referendum in Russian-speaking enclaves like Narva and Sillamäe in 1993. Furthermore, non-favourable "language laws" limited the use of Russian in civic life and employment, and citizenship was withheld from thousands of ethnic Russians, which only added to the discontent felt by the Russian-speaking community. However, unlike some post-communist regions (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Moldova and Ukraine), these events did not escalate into large-scale violence or prolonged conflicts.

The most recent violent episode involving the Russian minority in Estonia, known as the Bronze Night riots, occurred in 2007 and highlighted the lingering ethnic tensions stemming from the Soviet past. Over three nights in April 2007, street riots took place in the capital Tallinn and several cities in the north-east of Estonia (Narva, Jõhvi, Kohtla-Järve, Kiviõli and Sillamäe). Most of the participants in the riots were of Russian nationality or descent. Juurvee and Mattiisen (2020) described this as a hybrid conflict in which, besides Russian diplomatic pressure, media propaganda and cyberattacks, the ethnic divisions in society were exploited. Grievances among Russian speakers in Estonia, such as differing interpretations of history, as well as perceived discrimination and inequalities, were used by Russia to heighten discontent in Estonian society. Solska (2011) and Cheskin (2015), in their analysis of the event, pointed out that many protesters who waved Russian flags and shouted pro-Russian slogans felt that Estonians had better access to jobs, education, and political and community life due to their ethnic status.

Vetik et al. (2020) identify three main inequalities in ethnic relationships in Estonia: political-legal (a great number of Russian-speaking population), socio-economic (lower incomes, higher unemployment rate and lower probability of obtaining higher positions for ethnic minorities) and regional (with the less developed north-east containing a significant concentration of Russian speakers). Ethnic segregation remains high, as the majority and minority groups often live in separate linguistic and occupational environments (Petsinis, 2016). Since the 1990s, segregation has continued, and Russian speakers have concentrated more around areas with large Russian-speaking populations (Leetmaa, Tammaru & Hess, 2015), which may further influence ethnic relations.



For ethnic Russians, the main grievances are related to perceived social inequality and discrimination, low trust in government institutions, and unequal opportunities for public participation and recognition (Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2009; Korts, 2009). Russian speakers seek to protect their heritage, language and culture, and demand equal rights and a fair chance for a good life in Estonia (Włodarska-Frykowska, 2016). According to the 2020 Estonian Integration Monitoring Report (Anniste & Sepper, 2020), about 29% of ethnic minorities in Estonia felt unwelcome in the country and 38% felt like second-class citizens. More than two-thirds (73%) believed that Estonians have better job opportunities, and more than half (57%) thought Estonians have better educational opportunities. The 2017 report (Anniste, 2017) revealed that 73% of ethnic minorities felt that the preservation of their ethnic culture was endangered.

Objective indicators also indicate disparities in employment rates, with Estonians more likely to be employed. In 2019, 25% of ethnic minorities and 18% of ethnic Estonians belonged to the lowest income quintile, and 15% of ethnic minorities found themselves in relative poverty (Melesk & Masso, 2020). In 2020, only a third (34%) of the minorities considered their income fair, compared to 48% of Estonians (Melesk & Masso, 2020).

On the other hand, Estonians' concerns about ethnic conflict are often linked to loyalty and trust issues within the Russian-speaking minority. A key concern in post-Soviet nation-building has revolved around the categorisation of Soviet-era settlers, who are sometimes collectively referred to as "the coloniser" by Estonians (Peiker, 2016). Although ethnic assessments by both the majority and minority groups were rather negative in the early 1990s (Kelley, 2004, p. 95), these have softened a decade later, giving way to arguments downplaying any possibility of overt ethnic tensions and highlighting trends towards "pragmatic accommodation". However, the 2007 Bronze Night conflict revealed a deeper clash over values tied to interpretations of World War II (Peiker, 2016).

Russian imperialism continues to pose a challenge to Estonian sovereignty, particularly following Russia's aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Russia has attempted to influence Estonia's legislative processes and interethnic relations between Estonian and Russian speakers in Estonia, using Russian media channels. The Russian-speaking population

remains exposed to Russian media influence due to the widespread consumption of Russian media channels (Vihalemm, Juzefovičs & Leppik, 2019). According to the Estonian Integration Monitoring Report 2020, 61% followed Russian TV channels (Seppel, 2020, p. 74). Interethnic contact remains limited: only 36% of ethnic minorities and 38% of Estonians report engaging in conversations with individuals of different nationalities several times a month in the preceding six months (Kivistik, 2020).

While Estonia has managed to avoid major ethnic clashes since 2007, this stability is not guaranteed. As Kivirähk points out, “the present state of affairs offers plentiful opportunities for the regime in the Kremlin to deepen and exploit ethnic divisions and integration failures to its own benefit” (2014, p. 2). This statement still applies a decade later, as factors that could lead to tensions, including demographic differences, communication gaps, language issues, historical interpretations, mutual distrust, perceived discrimination and socio-economic disparities persist in Estonian society.

### **3. RESEARCH METHOD**

The aim of this article is to test the MICRI index using data from Estonian municipalities to evaluate potential vulnerabilities to immigration-related ethnic conflicts. Although MICRI is a novel index, reliability tests have yielded promising results. Internal consistency is ensured by carefully selecting indicators that measure relevant dimensions of conflict risk, such as identity, economic resources and social interactions. Cronbach’s alpha was used to verify the internal consistency of these measures, showing a good level of reliability with a score of 0.698. The comprehensive methodology for constructing the index is detailed in Maasing et al. (2021).

The data for the MICRI indicators (see Table 1) were sourced from the European Social Survey (ESS) rounds conducted in 2014, 2016 and 2018, specifically focusing on Estonia. These rounds were chosen as they were the most recent available at the time of the study. Municipality-level data from the ESS encompassed indicators DT1-2, V1-3, TH1-3, IN, D,

PC, LNO and LER1. Data for indicators ID1, ID2, LER2 and IM were obtained from the 2021 Estonian population census.

First, we calculated the MICRI values for 75 municipalities in Estonia. Four municipalities were excluded due to limited data availability (these were mainly very small municipalities, such as small islands). The formula for calculating the MICRI risk score for each municipality is as follows:

$$\text{MICRI}_n = w1_n * \text{Indicator1 Score} + w2_n * \text{Indicator2 Score} + \dots + w17_n * \text{Indicator17 Score}$$


where  $w1, w2, \dots, wn$  are the assigned weights for each indicator, and *Indicator1 Score, Indicator2 Score, ..., Indicator $n$  Score* represent the weighted scores of each indicator. The indicators are described in the first column of Table 1.

**Table 1.** Indicators used to assess potential ethnic conflict risk in Estonian municipalities (minimum, maximum, arithmetic mean and standard deviation in normalised and standardised modes for risk index calculations)

INDICATOR	MIN	MAX	MEAN	ST_D
ID1: Ethnic groups (15–85% of inhabitants identify as titular ethnic group; 1 = yes; 0 = no)	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.46
ID2: Religious groups (At least two groups form 5% of population) (1 = yes; 0 = no)	0.00	1.00	0.37	0.49
DT1: Generalised trust (% of people who do not trust others / 100)	0.00	0.42	0.23	0.09
DT2: Institutional trust (Mean % of people with low (< 5) trust in country's parliament, legal system, police, political parties, politicians / 100)	0.14	0.79	0.49	0.12
V1: Negative immigration attitudes (Mean % of people allowing few or no immigrants of (1) same race or ethnic group as majority, (2) different race or ethnic group from majority, (3) from poorer countries outside Europe / 100)	0.27	0.81	0.52	0.10
V2: Negative stereotypes (% of people who believe immigrants make country worse place to live / 100)	0.20	0.86	0.46	0.14
V3: Value gap (Difference between % of locals and immigrants who disagree that gay men and lesbians should be free to live as they wish / 100)	0.00	0.88	0.23	0.21

INDICATOR	MIN	MAX	MEAN	ST_D
TH1: Cultural threat (% who think immigrants undermine cultural life / 100)	0.07	0.69	0.35	0.12
TH2: Economic threat (% who think immigration is bad for economy / 100)	0.17	0.77	0.43	0.14
TH3: Physical threat (% who feel unsafe walking alone in local area after dark / 100)	0.00	0.48	0.15	0.11
IN: Perception of injustice (% who think they belong to a discriminated group in the country / 100) * 10	0.00	3.11	0.48	0.64
D: Dissatisfaction (% dissatisfied with life as a whole / 100) * 5	0.00	1.67	0.59	0.34
PC: Poor communication skills (% who think it is of little, no or no importance at all for them to understand different people / 100)	0.00	0.50	0.15	0.09
LNO: Low norm obedience (Mean % who say it is not important to them to (1) do what they are told and follow rules, and (2) behave appropriately / 100)	0.19	0.54	0.34	0.07
LER1: Poverty (% who find it difficult or very difficult to live on current income / 100)	0.00	0.69	0.27	0.15
LER2: Average registered unemployment rate over last 4 years / 100 * 10	0.17	0.67	0.31	0.10
IM: Average international immigration rate over last 4 years / 100 * 10	0.50	2.40	0.87	0.29

Next, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities with the most similar characteristics using RStudio, we applied hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward's method with squared Euclidean distance), a widely used approach for identifying natural groupings within data. This method minimises within-cluster variance while maximising between-cluster variance, resulting in distinct and meaningful clusters. The process began by computing the means for all variables within each cluster, followed by calculating the squared Euclidean distance to the cluster means for each object (municipality). The results were visualised in a dendrogram. Based on visual inspection, we identified four distinct and meaningful clusters in the dendrogram (Figure 1). Cluster analysis helped us to identify the main patterns of risk factors in different types of municipalities. The characteristic features of each cluster are described in the "Results" section.




**Figure 1.** Cluster dendrogram of Estonian municipalities. Each municipality is assigned an ID based on its geographic region (N = north; NE = north-east; W = west; C = central; S = south).

## 4. RESULTS: CONFLICT RISK LEVELS AND TYPOLOGIES OF ESTONIAN MUNICIPALITIES

We calculated the levels of immigration-related risk in 75 Estonian municipalities, comprising 15 urban and 60 rural municipalities. The average MICRI value across municipalities was 6.53, with scores ranging from 3.59 to 12.80 (Figure 2). Overall, the average risk levels in Estonian municipalities are relatively low.

Several factors contribute to the overall risk index with varying degrees of significance (see Table 1). On average, immigration intensity (IM) is clearly the most salient ethnic conflict risk factor in Estonia. The external immigration rate varies from 0.5 to 2.4 across municipalities. The second most influential risk factor is dissatisfaction with life (D), which also varies greatly across municipalities (min = 0.00, max = 1.67). Other notable ethnic conflict risk factors include negative attitudes towards immigrants (V1), distrust in state institutions (DT2), perception of injustice (IN), negative stereotypes about immigrants (V2) and perceived economic threats (TH2) attributed to immigration. Among these indicators, only perception of injustice (IN) varies substantially by municipality (min = 0.00, max = 3.11).



**Figure 2.** Risk scores of Estonian municipalities

The least influential conflict risk factors in Estonia are poverty (LER1), distrust of other people or groups (DT1), conflicting values (V3), perceived threats to physical security (TH3) and poor communication between groups (PC).

### URBAN V. RURAL AREAS

A comparison of urban and rural areas reveals a slightly higher conflict risk in cities. The average index value in urban areas is 8.24 (min = 5.45, max = 12.80), while rural areas have an average of 6.01 (min = 3.59, max = 9.88). Notably, 23 municipalities (including 9 cities), mainly located in the north, north-east and some in the south of Estonia, had multiple strong ethnic groups, often accompanied by religious heterogeneity.

In urban areas, residents tended to exhibit lower levels of distrust towards others and a heightened perception of threats to their physical security compared to rural municipalities. In north-eastern Estonia, concerns about physical security threats due to immigration were nearly three times higher. Distrust of others was more pronounced in the north-eastern and some southern municipalities, while trust levels were highest in western and northern Estonian municipalities.

Furthermore, feelings of injustice and dissatisfaction were somewhat more prevalent in urban areas than in rural municipalities. City residents reported nearly four times more feelings of injustice on average compared to their rural counterparts, with the highest levels found in north-eastern Estonia. This indicator exhibited a positive correlation with economic well-being, as municipalities facing higher poverty and unemployment rates tended to report heightened feelings of injustice.

Cities also experienced a higher rate of immigration compared to rural areas, especially in northern and southern municipalities with larger, more diverse cities.

In rural areas, negative attitudes and stereotypes towards immigrants are more prevalent, as are indicators such as perceived threats to culture posed by immigrants and conflicting values. Negative attitudes towards immigrants were most prominent in north-eastern, central and southern municipalities, while negative stereotypes about immigrants were most prevalent in southern Estonia. Concerns about immigrants posing a threat to culture were relevant in some municipalities in central Estonia.

## **5. TYPOLOGIES OF ESTONIAN MUNICIPALITIES**

Based on the cluster analysis, four types of municipalities were distinguished in Estonia. Table 2 shows that total risk levels are lowest in Type 1 and Type 2 municipalities and highest in Types 3 and 4. Close to two-thirds of the municipalities belong to Type 1 or Type 2, which are the least risk-prone groups. Only five municipalities belong to Type 4, which exhibits the highest risk on average. The Type 3 includes 20 municipalities.

**Table 2.** MICRI indicator arithmetic mean values and MICRI indicator values by municipality types

	AVERAGE	TYPE 1	TYPE 2	TYPE 3	TYPE 4
ID1: Groups with different ethnic identity	0.31	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.60
ID2: Groups with different religious identity	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00
DT1: Distrust of other people	0.23	0.23	0.18	0.24	0.30
DT2: Distrust of state institutions	0.49	0.49	0.44	0.50	0.57
V1: Negative attitudes toward immigrants	0.52	0.49	0.58	0.53	0.63
V2: Negative stereotypes toward immigrants	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.40
V3: Conflicting values (value gap)	0.23	0.22	0.26	0.24	0.19
TH1: Feelings of cultural threat	0.35	0.34	0.30	0.39	0.35
TH2: Feelings of economic threat	0.43	0.42	0.48	0.42	0.46
TH3: Feelings of threat to physical security	0.15	0.10	0.14	0.18	0.38
IN: Perception of injustice	0.48	0.26	0.19	0.56	2.43
D: Feelings of dissatisfaction	0.59	0.49	0.55	0.70	1.01
PC: Poor communication	0.15	0.14	0.26	0.11	0.12
LNO: Low norm/rule obedience	0.34	0.35	0.41	0.30	0.28
LER1: Poverty	0.27	0.24	0.29	0.25	0.50
LER2: Unemployment	0.31	0.28	0.31	0.31	0.54
IM: Municipality with intensive immigration rate	0.87	0.74	0.93	1.06	1.02
<b>Average conflict risk</b>	<b>6.53</b>	<b>5.26</b>	<b>6.79</b>	<b>8.29</b>	<b>9.79</b>
Number of municipalities belonging to this group	75	42	8	20	5



Four distinct types of municipalities can be characterised based on the MICRI index:

**Type 4 municipalities – cities with a significant foreign population facing multiple grievances**

The ethnic conflict risk level is highest in Type 4 municipalities, but it does not differ significantly (95% CI) from Type 3 municipalities (Figure 2). With an average MICRI value of 9.79, Type 4 municipalities considerably exceed the national average risk level. These municipalities can be characterised as religiously homogeneous, predominantly multi-ethnic communities with relatively high immigration rates.

Only five municipalities belong to this group, all of which are cities, primarily located in northern and north-eastern Estonia. Many are (former) industrial centres that host substantial immigrant populations, which can reach as high as 95% of their total population. These areas face ageing demographics, with a median population age close to 50 years (the national median is 42 years). Additionally, a significant portion of the residents in Type 4 municipalities lack proficiency in foreign languages, and their media consumption patterns differ from the rest of Estonia, with a preference for Russian-language media sources.

Economic well-being indicators in these municipalities lag behind other areas. The average monthly gross salary was around 1,100 euros in 2021, compared to 1,600 euros in wealthier municipalities. Notably, most of Type 4 municipalities belong to regions where the unemployment rate is nearly double the national average, standing at 11.5% compared to 6.2% (Statistics Estonia, 2021).

According to MICRI, the most prominent risk factor in Type 4 municipalities is the perception of injustice (IN), which is four times higher than the national average. General dissatisfaction with life (D) is almost double the national average. Factors such as distrust of other people/groups (DT1) and distrust of state institutions (DT2), negative attitudes towards immigrants (V1), and perceived threats to physical security (TH3) are highest in this group among all the municipalities. Alongside these grievances, economic disparities are more pronounced, with

higher poverty rates (LER1) and unemployment rates (LER2) compared to other municipality types.

In summary, Type 4 municipalities face a multitude of grievances and economic disparities. Despite having a resident population with an immigrant background, they may exhibit limited openness and trust towards newcomers. Distrust in state institutions, potentially influenced by their news sources or lack of interaction with the majority population, is a notable feature.

### **Type 3 municipalities – multi-ethnic and multi-religious municipalities with elevated immigration rates**

Type 3 municipalities exhibit an average MICRI value of 8.29, which exceeds the national average risk level. These municipalities are characterised by the coexistence of multiple groups with strong ethnic (ID1) and religious (ID2) identities, alongside a significant influx of immigration (IM). This group includes 20 municipalities, a third of which are cities, with the remainder being rural areas, often situated close to urban centres. More than half of these municipalities are in northern and north-eastern Estonia, and some are also in the southern and western regions. Notably, this category includes several of Estonia's major cities, which are frequent destinations for new immigrants.

The composition of the existing immigrant population varies across these municipalities, with foreign-background populations reaching as high as 88% in some, though most fall within the 15–50% range. The average population age is similar to the Estonian median age of 42 years, with these municipalities averaging 45 years (min = 39, max = 52). Economically, Type 3 includes both relatively poorer municipalities, primarily rural areas, and economically prosperous ones, including cities and municipalities near major urban centres. In 2021, the average monthly gross salary in these municipalities ranged from 1,100 euros to 1,600 euros, depending on the region (compared to the national average of 1,400 euros). Unemployment rates fluctuated from 4.2% to 11.5% (compared to the national average of 6.2%).

According to MICRI, the most prominent risk factors in Type 3 municipalities are a high immigration rate (IM), high general dissatisfaction

with life (D) and a strong perception of injustice (IN). While the levels of dissatisfaction and injustice are slightly above the national average, the immigration rate is notably higher, and immigration rates from external migration vary greatly ( $SD = 0.45$ ) among Type 3 municipalities. Some fall below the national average, while some reach maximum levels. Compared to other municipality types, Type 3 municipalities score lowest for poor communication (PC), suggesting that various ethnic groups within these communities engage in positive interactions. This increased social interaction with immigrants appears to mitigate negative attitudes or apprehensions towards immigration.

In summary, Type 3 municipalities are ethnically diverse and multi-religious communities experiencing substantial immigration. Different ethnic groups have positive intergroup interactions and attitudes towards immigration are relatively less negative. Yet, these areas tend to exhibit higher levels of general dissatisfaction and heightened perceptions of injustice.

### **Type 2 municipalities – ethnically homogeneous rural areas with immigration apprehensions**

With a MICRI value of 6.79, Type 2 municipalities are close to the national average risk level (Table 2). This category includes eight municipalities, most of which are rural areas in southern Estonia. Type 2 municipalities are characterised by ethnic homogeneity, being predominantly inhabited by ethnic Estonians, with no other ethnic group constituting more than 15% of their populations, but these municipalities also host various groups with strong religious identities (ID2). The age distribution in Type 2 municipalities closely mirrors the national average, at approximately 43 years. Economic conditions in some of the municipalities fall below the national average, with monthly gross salaries averaging around 1,100 euros, compared to the national average of 1,400 euros. Notably, although unemployment rates are low in these areas, averaging 5.3% compared to the Estonian average of 6.2%, monthly gross salaries remain relatively low.

According to MICRI, the risk indicators for Type 2 municipalities largely align with the national average (Table 2). However, a prominent risk factor is negative attitudes towards immigrants (V1), followed by feelings

of threat to economic resources attributed to immigration (TH2) and limited intergroup communication (PC). On average, residents in Type 2 municipalities tend to have fewer interactions with other groups, with the PC indicator nearly twice as high as in any other municipality type (Table 2). The perception of injustice (IN) is the lowest among all municipality types, and general satisfaction with life tends to be high.

In summary, MICRI results indicate that Type 2 municipalities are characterised by ethnic homogeneity, with limited interactions between native and immigrant groups. Residents of these municipalities tend to have some apprehensions about immigrants, despite experiencing relatively low levels of immigration.

### **Type 1 municipalities – ethnically and religiously homogeneous municipalities with low immigration rates and positive attitudes towards immigration**

Type 1 municipalities exhibit the lowest ethnic conflict risk level, with a MICRI value of 5.26, which is below the national average. Out of the 75 Estonian municipalities, 42 belong to this group, primarily rural areas and some small cities. These municipalities are evenly distributed across Estonia, with the exception of the north-eastern region, which registers higher conflict risk values.

Type 1 municipalities are characterised by the ethnic and religious homogeneity of their residents, the majority being ethnic Estonians, with a relatively low level of religiosity. The age distribution in this group averages around 39 years, which is younger than the national average. Most risk indicators in these municipalities align closely with or fall below the national average. Similar to Type 2 municipalities, the perception of injustice (IN) is notably low, under half of the average MICRI score. These municipalities feature a low rate of external immigration (IM) and lack significant concerns related to immigration. Additionally, low values for economic indicators (LER1 and LER2) suggest that economic well-being in these areas surpasses that of other municipalities. A characteristic feature of this municipal type is a low score for feelings of dissatisfaction (D), which may be associated with their ethnic and religious homogeneity and economic well-being.

In summary, Type 1 municipalities pose the lowest risk as they are characterised by homogeneity, low immigration rates, predominantly positive attitudes towards immigrants and minimal concerns related to immigration.

## 6. DISCUSSION

The primary aim of this study was to assess the susceptibility of Estonian municipalities to immigration-related ethnic conflicts using the MICRI index and to identify factors that may contribute to potential conflict risk. The analysis involved calculating risk scores for 75 Estonian municipalities, revealing varying degrees of vulnerability. Our findings indicate that, on average, Estonia maintains a low level of immigration-related risk, but specific municipalities exhibit higher risk levels, with varying risk factors prevailing in different areas.

The MICRI index results identified four distinct municipality types in Estonia, each with a unique risk profile. Approximately one-third of municipalities fall into Type 4 or Type 3, characterised by the highest susceptibility to conflict. These municipalities experience a substantial influx of immigrants and host multiple ethnic groups with strong identities. Residents in these areas report feelings of discrimination, higher dissatisfaction with life, and, in Type 4 municipalities, economic challenges such as elevated unemployment rates and economic dissatisfaction. Studies have shown that economic disparities (Isaksen, 2019) and increased immigration (Weber, 2015) contribute to negative attitudes towards immigration, which is also reflected in our results (Type 4). Notably, positive intergroup communication mitigates some negative attitudes and fears surrounding immigration, as observed in Type 3 municipalities, whereas this is lacking in Type 4 municipalities.

All municipalities in north-eastern Estonia belong to either Type 4 or Type 3. This result is consistent with previous research by Ehala and Zabrodskaia (2011), which showed that regional perceived stability was lowest in the eastern part of Estonia, where the Russian-speaking community forms an absolute majority. One significant risk factor in Type 4 is the sense of injustice, which is significantly higher compared

to other municipalities. Feelings of injustice, discrimination and distrust are core elements that, according to Adams (1965), might fuel conflicts. Particularly, we observed heightened feelings of injustice, mistrust and dissatisfaction, as well as increased concerns about physical security, in urban municipalities in the north-eastern region.

Type 1 and Type 2 municipalities, constituting two-thirds of all municipalities, exhibit lower risk levels. These areas are characterised by ethnic homogeneity and minimal immigrant influx. The key distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 municipalities lies in their attitudes toward immigrants and intergroup communication. While Type 1 municipalities harbour positive attitudes towards immigration, Type 2 municipalities exhibit negative attitudes and limited intergroup contact, reflecting the paradox of the contact hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that increased contact between different ethnic groups reduces prejudice, stereotypes and tensions, whereas limited contact amplifies fears (De Coninck, Rodríguez-de-Dios & d'Haenens, 2021). Type 1 and Type 2 municipalities are evenly distributed across Estonia, with no predominant regional concentration.

## CONCLUSION

Despite variations in risk levels among municipalities, the risks generally remain relatively low. The results of this study may provide additional insights into why Estonia has avoided major intergroup conflicts since 2007. Our study shows that Estonia can be characterised as a stable and relatively peaceful country with no imminent conflict risks. However, critical risk factors are present in all municipalities, and should these factors intensify, particularly in Type 4 municipalities, the emergence of immigration-related ethnic conflicts or tensions cannot be ruled out. As highlighted by Horowitz (1985), conflicts are often a deliberate political strategy employed by leaders and groups to advance their interests. Therefore, we cannot discount the possibility of (state) actors exploiting these vulnerabilities within Estonian society. Given the difficulty of finding a stable indicator to measure an actor's intent to mobilise a group, such assessments should complement the results of this study.

Our research identified that urban areas in northern and north-eastern Estonia are the most risk-prone. This finding may explain why the 2007 Bronze Night street riots in Estonia occurred primarily in the capital city and north-eastern urban areas. Groups living in these regions have many vulnerabilities, which were exploited by the Russian regime to create instability in Estonia. Therefore, monitoring regional stability is imperative for national and public security, especially considering Russia's potential interest in influencing the politics of countries with significant Russian compatriot populations.

While acknowledging that assessing immigration-related conflict risk is inherently complex and not an exact science, the MICRI index remains a valuable tool for risk evaluation. The results of this study are consistent with previous findings regarding the interethnic landscape in Estonia, which affirms the validity of the MICRI index in this context. It could, therefore, be cautiously applied to measure conflict susceptibility in other interethnic and immigration-prone settings.

**Contacts:****Helina Maasing, MSc**Email: [helinamaasing@gmail.com](mailto:helinamaasing@gmail.com)

University of Tartu

**Oliver Nahkur, PhD**Email: [oliver.nahkur@ut.ee](mailto:oliver.nahkur@ut.ee)

University of Tartu

**Ave Roots, PhD**

Email: [ave.roots@ut.ee](mailto:ave.roots@ut.ee)

University of Tartu

**Mare Ainsaar, PhD**

Email: [mare.ainsaar@ut.ee](mailto:mare.ainsaar@ut.ee)

University of Tartu



## REFERENCES AND SOURCES

- Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in Social Exchange. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 2, pp. 267–299. [www] DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60108-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60108-2)
- Allport, G. W. (1958). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Oxford, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Anniste, K. (2017). Võrdse kohtlemise ja võrdsete võimaluste tunnetamine. In: *Eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring 2017*. Balti Uuringute Instituut, SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis.
- Anniste, K. (2018). *Rändetrendid maailmas, Euroopas ja Eestis*. Tallinn: Arenguseire Keskus. [www] <https://arenguseire.ee/raportid/randetrendid-maailmas-euroopas-ja-eestis/> [Viewed on 10.01.2023].
- Anniste, K., & Sepper M.-L. (2020). Võimaluste võrdsuse tajumine ja ebavõrdse kohtlemise kogemused. In: *Eesti ühiskonna lõimumismonitooring 2020*. SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis, Balti Uuringute Instituut, Tallinna Ülikool, Tartu Ülikool, Turu-uuringute AS. [www] <https://www.kul.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2021-06/IntegratsiooniMonitooring2020.pdf> [Viewed on 2.02.2022].
- Arenguseire Keskus. (2023). Ukraina sõjapõgenikud Eestis – rahvastik ja lõimumine. Lühiraport, märts 2023. [www] [https://arenguseire.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2023\\_ukraina-sojapogenikud-eestis\\_lyhiraport.pdf](https://arenguseire.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2023_ukraina-sojapogenikud-eestis_lyhiraport.pdf)
- Bachmann, S.-D., & Paphiti, A. (2021). Mass Migration as a Hybrid Threat? – A Legal Perspective. *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 50(1), pp. 119–145.
- Cheskin, A. (2015). Identity and Integration of Russian Speakers in the Baltic States: A Framework for Analysis. *Ethnopolitics*, 14(1), pp. 72–93. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2014.933051>
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4), pp. 563–595.
- Costalli, S., & Moro, F. N. (2011). The Patterns of Ethnic Settlement and Violence: A Local-Level Quantitative Analysis of the Bosnian War. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(12), pp. 2096–2114. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.556748>
- Dancygier, R., & Latin, D. (2014). Immigration into Europe: Economic Discrimination, Violence and Public Policy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17, pp. 43–64.
- de Coninck, D., Rodríguez-de-Dios, I., & d’Haenens, L. (2021). The Contact Hypothesis During the European Refugee Crisis: Relating Quality and Quantity of (In)direct Intergroup Contact to Attitudes Towards Refugees. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 24(6), pp. 881–901. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220929394>

- Ehala, M., & Zobrodskaia, A. (2011). Interethnic Discordance and Stability in Estonia. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 42(2), pp. 213–237. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2011.569068>
- Enos, R. D. (2014). Causal Effect of Intergroup Contact on Exclusionary Attitudes. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111(10), pp. 3699–3704. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317670111>
- Esses, V. M., Jackson, L. M., & Armstrong, T. L. (1998). Intergroup Competition and Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration: An Instrumental Model of Group Conflict. *Journal of Social Issues*, 54(4), pp. 699–724. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.911998091>
- Glas, I., Jennissen, R., & Engbersen, G. (2021). Estimating Diversity Effects in the Neighborhood: On the Role of Ethnic Diversity and Out-Group Size and their Associations with Neighborhood Cohesion and Fear of Crime. *Social Indicators Research*, 158, pp. 1–22. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-021-02704-9>
- Greenhill, K. M. (2010). Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion. *Strategic Insights*, 9(1), pp. 116–159.
- Gridina, I., & Kasyanova, M. (2019). Russia's Migration Weapon Against Ukraine: A Socio-cultural Dimension. *Skhid*, 5(163), pp. 34–40.
- Halkia, M., Ferri, S., Schellens, M. K., Papazoglou, M., & Thomakos, D. (2020). The Global Conflict Risk Index: A Quantitative Tool for Policy Support on Conflict Prevention. *Progress in Disaster Science*, 6, 100069. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100069>
- Hegre, H., Allansson, M., Basedau, M., Colaresi, M., Croicu, M., Fjelde, H., et al. (2019). ViEWS: A Political Violence Early-Warning System. *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(2), pp. 155–174 [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319823860>
- Hellmann, J. H., Schlechter, P., Knausenberger, J., Bollwerk, M., Geukes, K., & Back, M. D. (2022). Measuring Perceived Realistic Physical Threat Imposed by Migrants. Scale Development and Validation. *European Journal of Psychological Assessment*, 38(4), pp. 332–342. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1027/1015-5759/a000668>
- Hopkins, D. J. (2010). Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), pp. 40–60. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990360>
- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- IMO / International Organization for Migration. (2010). International Migration Outlook. [www] <http://www.nbbmuseum.be/doc/seminar2010/nl/bibliografie/kansengroepen/sopemi2010.pdf> [Viewed on 22.02.2022].

- Isaksen, J. V. (2019). The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Attitudes toward Immigration. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 7(1), 24. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0127-5>
- Jakobsen, T. G., Isaksen, J. V., Skavhaug, G. K. O., & Anderssen Bakkan, H. (2016). The Turning Point of Tolerance. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 23(1), pp. 80–104.
- Jo, J.-I., & Choi, H. J. (2019). Enigmas of Grievances about Inequality: Effects of Attitudes toward Inequality and Government Redistribution on Protest Participation. *International Area Studies Review*, 22(4), pp. 348–368. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865919833973>
- Juurvee, I., & Mattiisen M. (2020). The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict. International Centre for Defense and Security. [www] <https://icds.ee/en/the-bronze-soldier-crisis-of-2007/> [Viewed on 28.10.2022].
- Karreth, J., Singh, S. P., & Stojek, S. M. (2015). Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration: The Role of Regional Context and Individual Predispositions. *West European Politics*, 38(6), pp. 1174–1202. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1022039>
- Kelley, J. G. (2004). *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Kern, A., Marien, S., & Hooghe, M. (2015). Economic Crisis and Levels of Political Participation in Europe (2002–2010): The Role of Resources and Grievances. *West European Politics*, 38(3), pp. 465–490. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.993152>
- Kivirähk, J. (2014). Integrating Estonia's Russian-Speaking Population: Findings of National Defense Opinion Survey. International Centre for Defence and Security. [www] [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2014/Juhan\\_Kivirahk\\_-\\_Integrating\\_Estonias\\_Russian-Speaking\\_Population.pdf](https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2014/Juhan_Kivirahk_-_Integrating_Estonias_Russian-Speaking_Population.pdf) [Viewed on 28.10.2022]
- Kivistik, K. (2020). Eesti elanike keeleoskus ja -kasutus, inimestevahelised kontaktid, sallivus ning eesti keele väärtustamine. In: *Eesti ühiskonna lõimumismonitooring 2020*. SA Poliitikauringute Keskus Praxis, Balti Uuringute Instituut, Tallinna Ülikool, Tartu Ülikool, Turu-uuringute AS. [www] <https://www.kul.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2021-06/IntegratsiooniMonitooring2020.pdf> [Viewed on 2.02.2022].
- Kolstø, P. (2002). *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Korts, K. (2009). Inter-Ethnic Attitudes and Contacts between Ethnic Groups in Estonia. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 40(1), Special issue: From Post-Communism to the EU: Estonia's Transition 20 Years On, pp. 121–137.

- Leetmaa, K., Tammaru, T., & Hess, D. B. (2015). Preferences toward Neighbor Ethnicity and Affluence: Evidence from an Inherited Dual Ethnic Context in Post-Soviet Tartu, Estonia. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 105(1), pp.162–182.
- Maasing, H., Nahkur, O., Ainsaar, M., & Roots, A. (2021). MICRI: A Composite Index for Measuring the Risk of Immigration-Related Conflicts. *Individual and Society*, 24/2021. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/cas.2021.04.592>
- Marozzi, M. (2016). Construction, Robustness Assessment and Application of an Index of Perceived Level of Socio-Economic Threat from Immigrants: A Study of 47 European Countries and Regions. *Social Indicators Research*, 128, pp. 413–437. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-015-1037-z>
- Melesk, K., & Masso, M. (2020). Hõive ja toimetulek. In: *Eesti ühiskonna lõimumismonitooring 2020*. SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis, Balti Uuringute Instituut, Tallinna Ülikool, Tartu Ülikool, Turu-uuringute AS. [www] <https://www.kul.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2021-06/IntegratsiooniMonitooring2020.pdf> [Viewed on 1.02.2022].
- Peiker, P. (2016). Estonian Nationalism through the Postcolonial Lens. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 47, pp. 1–20. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2015.1103516>
- Petsinis, V. (2016). Ethnic Relations, the EU, and Geopolitical Implications: The Cases of Croatia and Estonia. *Ethnopolitics*, 15(2), pp. 230–244.
- Putnam R. D. E. (2007). Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(2), pp. 137–174. [www] DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.xhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar\\_lookup?journal=Scandinavian+Political+Studies&title=E+pluribus+unum:+Diversity+and+community+in+the+twenty%E2%80%90first+century+the+2006+Johan+Skytte+prize+lecture&author=R.+D.+Putnam&volume=30&issue=2&publication\\_year=2007&pages=137-174&](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.xhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?journal=Scandinavian+Political+Studies&title=E+pluribus+unum:+Diversity+and+community+in+the+twenty%E2%80%90first+century+the+2006+Johan+Skytte+prize+lecture&author=R.+D.+Putnam&volume=30&issue=2&publication_year=2007&pages=137-174&)
- Schimmele, C., & Wu, Z. (2015). The New Immigration and Ethnic Identity. Population Change and Lifecourse Strategic Knowledge. Cluster Discussion Paper Series/ Un Réseau stratégique de connaissances. Changements de population et parcours de vie Document de travail, 3(1), Article 1. [www] <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pclcr/vol3/iss1/1>
- Schulze, M., & Krätschmer-Hahn, R. (2014). Relative Deprivation Theory. In: Michalos, A. C. (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*. Springer, Dordrecht. [www] DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5\\_2457](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_2457)

- Statistics Estonia. (2021). Suur Eesti rahva e-loendus 2021 tulemused maakondlik vaade. [www] <https://rahvaloendus.ee/et/tulemused> [Viewed on 11.12.2022].
- Seppel, K. (2020). Meedia ja infoväli. In: *Eesti ühiskonna lõimumismonitooring 2020*. SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis, Balti Uuringute Instituut, Tallinna Ülikool, Tartu Ülikool, Turu-uuringute AS. [www] <https://www.kul.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2021-06/IntegratsiooniMonitooring2020.pdf>
- Solska, M. (2011). Citizenship, Collective Identity and the International Impact on Integration Policy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63(6), pp. 1089–1108. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/1080/09668136.2011.585762>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In: Worchel, S., & Austin, W. G. (eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall, pp. 7–24.
- Tiit, E.-M. (2011). *Eesti rahvastik. Viis põlvkonda ja kümme loendust*. Eesti Statistika.
- Vetik, R., Kunitsõn, N., Koppel, K, Shaharyar, N., & Polõnin I. (2020). Eesti ühiskonna lõimumise suur pilt. Segregatsioonist sisususeni. In: *Eesti ühiskonna lõimumismonitooring 2020*. SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis, Balti Uuringute Instituut, Tallinna Ülikool, Tartu Ülikool, Turu-uuringute AS, pp. 101–117. [www] <https://www.kul.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2021-06/IntegratsiooniMonitooring2020.pdf>
- Vihalemm, T., & Kalmus, V. (2009). Cultural Differentiation of the Russian Minority. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 40(1), pp. 95–119.
- Vihalemm, T., Juzefovičs, J., & Leppik, M. (2019). Identity and Media-Use Strategies of the Estonian and Latvian Russian-Speaking Populations amid Political Crisis. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 71(1), pp. 48–70. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1533916>
- Weber, H. (2015). National and Regional Proportion of Immigrants and Perceived Threat of Immigration: A Three-Level Analysis in Western Europe. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 56(2), pp. 116–140. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715215571950>
- Włodarska-Frykowska, A. (2016). Ethnic Russian Minority in Estonia. *International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal*, 18(2), pp. 153–164. [www] DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1515/ipcj-2016-0015>