



THE PERCEPTION OF POLICE MESSAGES IN ESTONIAN AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN ESTONIA DURING TIMES OF CRISIS

Elen Laanemaa, MA

*Estonian Academy of Security Sciences
The Language Centre
Head of the Language Centre, Lecturer of the English language
Estonia*

Aida Hatšaturjan, PhD

*Estonian Academy of Security Sciences
The Language Centre
Senior Lecturer of the Russian language
Estonia*

Marju Taukar, PhD

*Estonian Academy of Security Sciences
The Language Centre
Lecturer of the English language
Estonia*

Kerli Linnat, MA

*Estonian Academy of Security Sciences
The Language Centre
Junior Lecturer of the English language
Estonia*

Veronika Ehrenbusch, MA

*Estonian Academy of Security Sciences
Police and Border Guard College
Senior Teacher
Estonia*

Keywords: crises, public awareness, mass media, police messages, Estonian language community, Russian language community

ABSTRACT

Two major crises, the COVID-19 crisis of 2019-2021 and the subsequent Ukraine conflict that began in 2022, have had a significant impact on the global political and social landscape. These crises necessitated the implementation of new rules and restrictions, which were communicated to the public through government orders and media channels. However, it became evident that there were divergent understandings and attitudes towards these measures within Estonian society. This highlights the importance of enhancing public awareness and responsiveness during crises. This research aims to conduct an in-depth analysis of how messages from the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board are received and interpreted, specifically targeting the Estonian and Russian-speaking communities. By comparing comprehension and interpretation of messages among these language groups, valuable insights can be gained for the development of more effective public awareness campaigns. The study was conducted between September 2022 and April 2023, yielding significant findings that can guide the design of campaigns to ensure universal understanding across Estonia's two largest language communities. The results of this study may be of interest to law enforcement agencies in Estonia and other countries, as they can provide valuable insights for correcting and improving the communication strategies of law enforcement agencies when interacting with multicultural populations and ensuring effective public notifications.

ABBREVIATIONS

- PBGB Police and Border Guard Board (in Estonian: *Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet* or PPA).
- ET Readers of PBGB informational texts in the Estonian language version.
- RU Readers of PBGB informational texts in the Russian language version.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 crisis between 2019 and 2021 had a profound impact on our society, ushering in new rules and restrictions implemented through government orders and primarily communicated to the public via the media. During this crisis, it became evident that there were differing understandings and attitudes towards these new rules within Estonian society (see, for example, Tiit, Makarova, 2020). Furthermore, the war that began in Ukraine in 2022 has further influenced the global political and social situation. Based on the experiences from these significant crises, an important question arises: how can public awareness be increased and responsiveness strengthened for future crises? The Internal Security Development Plan 2020-2030 of the Estonian Republic also emphasises the importance of enhancing awareness and bolstering societal responsiveness (Internal Security Development Plan 2020-2030).

The objective of this study is to assess how the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB), as the authority responsible for ensuring internal security in Estonia, is perceived by representatives of the two largest language communities through their communication of informational texts with the public. Although the specific texts studied are not directly related to COVID or the war in Ukraine, they nevertheless enable us to examine whether and how the messages are perceived and considered by the audience. The aim is to propose improvements to enhance the awareness and preparedness of Estonian residents handling potential crises.

This study is based on the hypothesis that messages conveyed in different languages are perceived differently. The primary research question was, therefore, how the Estonian and Russian-speaking target communities perceive the informational texts from the Estonian Police, considering possible power dynamics detected within them. The purpose of this research was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of how messages conveyed in different languages are received and whether there are variations in understanding and interpretation between the Estonian and Russian-speaking target groups. The findings of the study offer insights into the understanding and comprehension of police messages among various societal groups. They also provide us with a valuable foundation for designing and tailoring public awareness campaigns to ensure that the messages are universally understood across all language

communities. The study was conducted between September 2022 and April 2023.

1. COMMUNICATION POLICY OF THE ESTONIAN POLICE AND BORDER GUARD BOARD

The Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB) follows a communication policy that is guided by its core values. While the PBGB does not have a separate communication strategy, its external communication is founded on the general strategy, which encompasses principles for engaging with the public. The emphasis is on the effectiveness of preventive communication, necessitating a greater and more skilful utilisation of technology. Campaigns are tailored to the specific needs of target audiences and collaboration with other media institutions is deemed important to amplify each other's messages (Prevention Work Concept, 2018, p. 9).

Communication is not merely a supporting activity; it's an integral part of the PBGB's core work, as the police exist to serve the people. The PBGB strives to share necessary, important and interesting information with the public to increase safety and prevent risks. The "Police Handbook" emphasises the significance of well-designed recommendations within conveyed messages, empowering individuals to take action to prevent danger or accidents (Vanaisak, 2018, p. 14). The messages should focus on creating and promoting a sense of security (Ibid, p. 21). Honest, open and easily understandable communication is essential for preserving people's sense of security and trust in both the police and the state. The spokespersons are primarily officers who bridge the gap between those responsible for ensuring people's safety and the public.

The PBGB employs various channels for information dissemination, including a daily event overview (a summary of offences and border incidents provided once a day to the media, covering the past 24 hours), issuing press releases, responding to media inquiries and arranging interviews, proactively suggesting topics to journalists and posting updates posts on PBGB's social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter) and PBGB's external website, www.politsei.ee.

PBGB press releases are structured in the form of news articles (inverted pyramid format), enabling the media to publish them as news with minimal editing. The language used is intended to instil a sense of security and consequently, public messages from the PBGB also emphasise safety promotion and the prevention of potential dangers. In public communication, clear language principles are followed whenever possible, with a preference for simple wording and sentence structure and avoiding the use of officialese. The reasons behind the actions taken by the PBGB and how they contribute to enhancing safety are explained. Empathy is employed when addressing topics, ensuring that public messages do not needlessly offend anyone's feelings and that prevention messages do not come at the expense of victims.

Important press releases are also translated into Russian, along with messages directly relevant to the Russian-speaking population such as warnings about telephone scams that primarily target Russian-speaking individuals. The PBGB's Communication Office includes a specialist in Russian communication who assesses the necessity for Russian-language notifications. The PBGB maintains a separate media list for these press releases, encompassing all Russian-language media in Estonia.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE

The study is based on an experimental approach aimed at determining how respondents from various language groups perceive the content of the same source text (message). Because the research unit lacked access to general national contact data for the study, a method called non-probability random sampling was used (Kumar, 2011). Colleagues, friends and acquaintances from both language groups, as well as individual email addresses (a total of 630 emails), were used and questionnaires were distributed. This approach guaranteed diversity in the sample (as described below) and the representation of various language groups.

The research employed an experimental approach that specifically focused on reactive reading and the perception of the message being read. The experiment was divided into two parts: in the first stage,

respondents were asked to read texts and in the second stage, they completed a questionnaire. In the first part, the aim was to determine the message perceived by the respondent in the text and its impact on their behaviour and emotional perception (whether the message was commanding, friendly, threatening, etc.). This approach offered insight into the message’s impact on participants from both language groups and their interpretation of it.

The research method employed a self-administered questionnaire, combining qualitative content analysis with quantitative data (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Denscombe, 2010). The data collection questionnaire (see Appendix 1) comprised 32 questions, including both open-ended and closed questions, with the inclusion of a Likert scale in some of them. This versatile questionnaire allowed for gathering various responses and exploring participants’ perceptions of the message on multiple levels. Based on the respondents’ answers and comments, meaningful categories were formed, which are described in detail below.




Figure 1. Age of Estonian-speaking (ET) respondents.

A total of 203 respondents participated in the study with 167 completing the experiment in Estonian and 36 in Russian. In both groups, the proportion of women was significantly higher, with 67% among Estonian respondents and 72% among Russian respondents. In terms of age, ET (Estonian) and RU (Russian) respondents exhibited a similar distribution (see Figures 1 and 2).

In the ET group, respondents were evenly distributed between the 25-44 and 45-64 age groups, while in the RU group, there was a slightly higher proportion of respondents in the age group of 45-64 compared to the 25-44 age group, with 47% and 36%, respectively. There were a few individual respondents in both groups who were younger and older. The groups had a relatively consistent educational level, with the majority of respondents having higher education – 51% in the ET group and 56% in the RU group (see Figures 3 and 4). In the RU group, more respondents had vocational education compared to secondary education, with 22% and 14% respectively, while in the ET group, both groups were equally represented at 19%.




Figure 2. Age of Russian-speaking (RU) respondents.




Figure 3. Figure 3. Education level of Estonian-speaking (ET) respondents.




Figure 4. Education level of Russian-speaking (RU) respondents.

In analysing the results, it's essential to note two factors: firstly, the difference in the size of the two respondent groups, with 167 in the ET group and 36 in the RU group; secondly, the demographic characteristic that the majority of the respondents were educated women. This can be considered a limitation of the study and substantial conclusions cannot be drawn based on these results. However, it provides a good starting point for further research, which can target a different demographic group or dimension.

3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: LINGUISTIC TEXT ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNICATION AND POWER RELATIONS

The purpose of the target texts is to establish a communicative situation between the author (in this case, an institution) and the reader through the use of specific language. In the context of this study, which examines the reception and perception of announcements issued by the PBGB, an overview of the linguistic text analysis used is provided.

According to Estonian linguist Reet Kasik (2002), in the 1970s and 1980s, linguistic research largely focused on the relationship between reality and the discourses that describe and shape it. However, by the end of the century, the focus shifted towards more detailed ‘linguistic’ analysis, primarily examining the language used in discourses and how meaning is expressed. Therefore, the goal of text analysis is to highlight language’s polyfunctionality, serving both as a means to describe things and creating situations, connections and relationships. While texts never appear to be isolated or devoid of context, lacking a single definitive interpretation, interpretation is not entirely arbitrary. Text analysis helps to identify the possible interpretations of a given text and how they are related to the linguistic choices made within the text. Thus, this analysis examines linguistic units such as syntactic, lexical, thematic, argumentative and rhetorical choices, while also assessing the overall cohesion of the text and the communicative meaning it conveys. This method aligns with the meta functions of M.A.K. Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics, namely the ideational function (describing and creating a representation of the world and experiences), the textual function (cohesively integrating content) and the interpersonal function (shaping social relationships) (Halliday, Matthiessen, 2004).

The concept of linguistic relativity, which suggests that language shapes the way people think, has been known and studied for centuries and it became a specialised field of linguistics in the first half of the 20th century, led by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf and further developed by other scholars (see: Brown & Lenneberg, 1954; Gumperz & Levinson 1996). When language is viewed as a tool for experiencing the world, it naturally becomes a vehicle for the exercise of power.

The issue of language and power has been and continues to be a subject of research at the interface of philosophy, sociology and linguistics. Thus, Pierre Bourdieu considered language as a medium of power that allows those involved in linguistic interaction to carry and express their interests, whereby any linguistic interaction between communication actors reflects the characteristics of the social reality they express (Bourdieu, 1991). Drawing on Bourdieu's concept and based on the main aspects of the manifestation of symbolic power, i.e., signification, interpretation, manipulation and construction of meaning, Claire Kramsch examines the process of constructing symbolic power in communication. She notes that linguistic interaction inevitably results in the construction of symbolic power, such as the transformation of communication from an information exchange to a linguistic performance (i.e., a demonstration of linguistic competence) in the communication between a native and a non-native speaker (Kramsch, 2016, 2020). Norman Fairclough examines language concerning power and ideology, employing the concept of critical discourse analysis, which aims to analyse social interaction from the perspective of linguistic components to reveal their hidden determinants in the system of social relations and the hidden consequences of their impact on society (Fairclough, 2001). Estonian linguist Tiit Hennoste notes that when we talk about the relationship between power and language, we usually tend to talk about how political, economic and journalistic power is realised through language, e.g., by obscuring certain concepts and using specific connotations or ambiguous formulations to influence readers' perceptions (Hennoste, 2018). Kasik (2007) explores how power relations are expressed through language and, conversely, how language creates new power relations. When an institution sends a message to a citizen, expecting an actionable response, such texts typically consist of two parts: a directive part and an explanatory background part. According to Kasik, the background section of official texts is usually rational and informative, aimed at convincing the recipient that the request is indeed reasonable. As directives aim to elicit specific behaviour from the message recipient, the survey conducted for this study included questions about the nature of the text's delivery, inquiring whether it came across as a warning, threatening, commanding, neutral, friendly-amicable, advisory or instructive-educational.

The pragmatic potential of a text results from the author's choices concerning both its content and linguistic expression. In language, the

author selects the necessary units that carry both a simple objective meaning and a connotative meaning. The author also constructs expressions using grammar to establish the necessary meaningful connections, ultimately shaping the final pragmatic potential, which refers to its ability to create a communicative effect (Komissarov, 1990; Kamenskaya, 1990; Galperin, 2007; Kolshanski, 2007 et al.).

4. THE LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATIONAL TEXTS USED IN THE STUDY

4.1. THE INFORMATIONAL TEXT 1 IN ESTONIAN AND RUSSIAN

The informative structure of the text (see Appendix 2), comprising five paragraphs (six in the Russian version), adheres to the communication principles established by the PBGB, as it does not require specialised or terminological competence from the reader to understand the text. The responsible official in the field is quoted twice in the text. The text's purpose is to encourage readers to take note of the preferred locations of speeding drivers and to report them using a web application. The article begins with the directive part, i.e., the title and the first paragraph, explaining the necessity of taking action. This is followed by the background section, comprising the next three paragraphs, where the reader's civic duty, emotions and sense of community are appealed to through direct quotations from a police officer.

In the first text, the reader is addressed directly only in the headline, using the imperative form (*inform*). Subsequently, the personal indicative form is employed only for PBGB as the agent of the sentence (*is waiting, we steer*) and the text concludes with the impersonal form (*is expected*). On the other hand, as noted by linguist and researcher Ene Vainik from the Institute of the Estonian Language, "lexical effectiveness starts from presence", which is indicated, e.g., by deictic¹ temporal and locative markers and first-person singular and plural personal pronouns, which enhance the contextual coherence of sentences and the closeness of the

¹ *Deixis* refers to the use of linguistic expressions and other signs that can be interpreted only by the participants of a communicative act, referring to place, time and always being related to reality. The corresponding verbal means are called deictic expressions. Three main types of deixis are distinguished: personal, spatial and temporal (see, for example, Pajusalu et al., 2004, in Estonian).

speaker-listener relationship (i.e., the referents of expressions are known only to the participants and in the given speech situation) (Vainik, 2012, 654-655). In this text, examples of such deictic markers are the pronoun *we*, the verb form *we steer* directly indicating PBGB, the adverb *together* referring to PBGB and the readers, as well as temporal markers such as *now that there are* and *this year*.

Participation in the given situation can also be linguistically created using intensity markers, which either emphasise or diminish the degree of a particular quality. These include augmentative adverbs, emphatic adverbs, modifiers and qualifiers as well as figurative expressions. For, in the PBGB text, words such as *kõik* (all), *igaiüks* (everyone), *pidevalt* (constantly), *äärmiselt oluline* (highly important), *kõige põletavam* (the most pressing), *eriti* (especially) and just (conveyed in the English translation with the grammatically emphatic structure *it is the excessive speed that*) illustrate the speaker's attitude. The level of intensity can also intertwine with evaluation, where emphatic adverbs affirm the truthfulness of the message or negate it. In the example sentence, the emphatic adverb *ikka* (still) conveys a silent presence and the expression of an opposing opinion: *suuname juhid mõtlema, kas mõni sekund ajavõitu on ikka väärt enda ja teiste elu ohtu seadmist* (we steer drivers to think if the few seconds they gain is worth putting their own and other people's lives at risk). While the text generally avoids figurative expressions, the figurative and alliterative superlative noun phrase *põletavam probleem* (the most pressing problem) emphasises the gravity of the situation.

The Russian version of text 1 is written in a more formal and informative style, typical of public announcements and official documents. The text uses specific vocabulary related to the area of police and traffic, such as *Департамент полиции и пограничной охраны* (PBGB), *наблюдения* (observations), *надзор за дорожным движением* (traffic surveillance), *превышение скорости* (speeding), *разрешенная скорость* (permitted speed).

The author presents facts and justifications to persuade readers to participate in the decentralized initiative and provide information about cases/dangers of exceeding the speed limit. Intensity markers are similarly used in the Russian text to emphasise the importance of safety and highlight the possible consequences of speeding, including serious injuries and

death. Therefore, the text contains arguments directed towards the emotional aspect, such as *трагические последствия* (tragic consequences), *опасность* (danger), *смерть* (death), *тяжелые повреждения* (severe injuries), *задуматься* (to think), *подвергать опасности свою жизнь* (to jeopardise one's life), *родной край* (homeland, native land). Similar to the Estonian text, words with a negative connotation predominate to evoke concern in the reader and thereby create a desire to take action and contribute towards avoiding negative scenarios on Estonian roads.

Also, the text in Russian directly addresses the audience with imperative calls to participate in the campaign and report observations through a dedicated application. This is evident in the use of the imperative verb and the pronoun *вы* (you) in the title². It mentions that the police are anticipating observations through a special application. The Russian text also includes presence markers, such as the pronoun *мы* (we, referring to PBGB and the readers collectively), the verb *заставляем* (we make/force to think) and time markers *сейчас* (now) and *в этом году* (this year).

Unlike the Estonian text, the Russian version is stylistically less uniform. On one hand, it exhibits characteristics of a formal style, incorporating specific terminology from the police and traffic domains, as well as the bureaucratic language: *сосредоточена* (centred), *в рамках* (within the framework), *производить надзор* (to conduct surveillance), *обеспечение безопасности* (ensuring safety), *является* (is). On the other hand, it also incorporates words typical of colloquial style, such as the adjective *гоняющих* (racing, speeding) and other figurative expressions. The text also contains generalising word combinations and phrases that render the message meaningless, such as “*Цель толоки – с помощью сообщества многого добиться*” (The goal of the campaign is to achieve much with the help of the community). This phrase sounds somewhat ambiguous and clumsy in Russian, as the word *сообщества* refers to a narrower group of people, necessitating contextual clarification as it's unclear which community is being referred to. Presumably, the word *общество* (society) was intended. Similar stylistic and pragmatic mismatches can create ambiguity and impede successful communication.

² According to Russian grammar rules, the pronoun *Вы* is written with a capital letter when politely addressing one person and *вы* is used when addressing multiple people.

Another potential issue affecting the readability of the Russian text is syntactic inconsistencies, such as *именно слишком высокая скорость* (particularly too high speed). According to Russian syntax rules, using two parts of speech (an intensifying particle and an expressive adverb) within one sentence to enhance the intensity of an adjective (*именно слишком высокая* / especially too high) is redundant and incorrect. The Russian text also relies on intensity markers to emphasise the gravity of the situation and encourage participation, such as *особенно сейчас* (especially now), *именно* (namely), *слишком* (too much), *самая острая* (most acute), *нуждается* (in need of), *высокая скорость* (high speed), *основная причина* (the main reason). It's essential to note that from a pragmatic perspective, the use of intensity markers primarily aims to strengthen the evaluation. However, an evaluation alone may not be persuasive unless supported by facts or illustrations. Therefore, the use of intensity markers might have the opposite effect of what is intended.

4.2. THE INFORMATIONAL TEXT 2 IN ESTONIAN AND RUSSIAN

In the second analysed text (text 2), the reader's participation in the communication is indirect as they are not directly addressed. However, the text describes past events and offers recommendations for certain behaviours. The text consists of seven paragraphs of varying length, ranging from one to three sentences, including three quotes from the respective head of the department.

The conveyance of information starts with a descriptive background section, describing recent, seemingly mysterious cases of money disappearing. The directive part appears towards the end of the article where recommendations are given, either indirectly or in an impersonal form: *tasub meeles pidada* in Estonian / *надо помнить* in the Russian version (it is worth keeping in mind); *tasub olla kriitiline* / *следует соблюдать осторожность* (it is worth being critical); *aitab ainult hea küberhügieen* / *поможет только хорошая кибергигиена* (only good cyber-hygiene will help) or even the first-person plural form *soovitame* (we recommend). However, in the Russian-language text, there is a direct directive sentence in the final part: *нельзя загружать и открывать такие файлы* (one must not download and open such files), where the modal

verb *нельзя* (one must not) expresses both prohibition and obligation. This directive tone is reinforced by the use of two verbs forbidding action in the text: *загружать* (to download) and *открывать* (to open). It should be noted that the Russian text also contains several intensity markers, such as *самый* (most common), *довольно* (quite), *надо* (necessary), *достаточно* (sufficient), *даже* (even), etc.

Presence markers occur in both temporal and locative expressions in every paragraph of the text, such as *viimasel ajal* / *в последнее время* (recently/lately), *hiljuti* / *недавно* (recently), *tänapäeval* (these days) / *довольно распространено* (in the Russian text, there's a reference to the current state using adverbs and adjectives in combination with the predicate: *quite widespread*), *viimastel aastatel* / *в последние годы* (in the recent years), *säärased juhtumid* / *другие похожие случаи* (such cases), *taolisi* / *такие* (such), *eelmaintud* (described above) / *другие похожие случаи* (other similar cases). There are fewer intensity markers in this text and they appear in the direct quotation of the police officer (*sagenenud* / *участились* (increasing), *vaid* / *лишь* (only), *достаточно* (enough). In the concluding instructive and advisory paragraph, there are also intensity markers (*ainult* / *только* (only), emphasising the directive function of the text.

The overall vocabulary used in the text is assessed as neutral by the emotion detector software of the Institute of the Estonian Language. However, in the comparison of positively and negatively charged words, the negative ones dominate. This includes phrases such as *rahavaraga nakatumine* (infection with malware) mentioned five times in the Estonian text and four times in the Russian text, where the word *вирус* (virus) is also used twice. The phrase *raha kadumine* (disappearance of money) is mentioned twice, with variations like *исчезновения* (disappearance), *пропадают* (go missing, disappear), *пропажи* (missing, disappearances) in the Russian version of text 2. Additionally, various expressions referring to criminal activities are mentioned, such as *vargus* (theft) in the Estonian text corresponding to *пропажа* in the Russian text, *kahjud* / *ущерб* (losses), *kelmid* / *мошенник(и)* (scammers), *küberkuritegu* / *киберпреступления* (cybercrime) and *kergeusklik* / *доверчивые* (gullible, trustful).

The second informational text primarily has an informative and cautionary modality, providing specific details about the cases and giving advice on how to protect oneself from malware infection. The Estonian text does not contain strong emotional language but focuses on raising awareness and offering practical guidance through particular methods. In the Russian version of the text, the first part is mainly advisory, while the final section contains a straightforward directive instruction with a strictly prohibitive valence. While the Estonian text is assessed as more neutral by the emotion detector, with the repetition of negatively charged words possibly creating a somewhat sinister tone, the Russian text features a strong presence of reinforcing words with prohibitive tonality.

In summary, the Estonian notification texts of the PBGB are not direct orders or requests, but rather take the form of newspaper articles that encourage readers to be vigilant or attentive. The directive verbs used in the texts do not issue commands or threats; instead, most of the verb constructions pertain to the PBGB (in the first text: ‘expects-expected’, ‘invites’, ‘to do together’, ‘to make one think and understand’, ‘offers everyone an opportunity’, ‘direct’, i.e., no obligation with respective modal verbs such as ‘must’, etc.; in the second text, mostly the impersonal approach is used, ‘a few steps worth remembering’, ‘it is worth being critical’, ‘only good cyber-hygiene can prevent it’). Hence, there are no direct obligatory functions, no mention of sanctions and the texts are primarily characterised by an instructive and guiding desire to enhance our lives – a rationale that would benefit both readers and others, traffic would calm down and there would be fewer cybercriminals threats. Although, in general, similar linguistic and semantic tools are presented in the Russian versions of informational texts, there’s a slight prevalence of emphasised directives and a certain level of formality in terms of modality and valency, which in turn may influence the reception of the text’s message.

5. DATA ANALYSIS AND THE RESULTS OBTAINED

To analyse the perception of the texts, the following categories were formed, about the linguistic and communicative aspects of the texts:

- I. ***Readability of the text.*** The category refers to how easily the text can be read and understood by the reader. It may involve factors such as sentence structure, choice of vocabulary and the overall clarity of the writing.
- II. ***Nature of the text.*** The category refers to the genre or type of text being analysed. It could include categories such as informative, persuasive, instructional, etc., which describe the overall purpose and style of the text.
- III. ***Comprehensibility of the text content.*** The category relates to the extent to which the information presented in the text is clear and understandable to the reader. It considers how well the content is organised, explained and presented.
- IV. ***Understanding the purpose of the text.*** The category refers to the reader's ability to grasp the intended purpose or goal of the text. It involves understanding the primary message or call to action conveyed by the text.
- V. ***Impact of the text's message on the reader's behaviour.*** The category explores the influence or effect of the message on the reader's actions or behaviour. It examines whether the text motivates or prompts the reader to take a certain action or change their behaviour in some way.
- VI. ***Importance of the message for the reader.*** The category focuses on the perceived significance or relevance of the text's message to the reader. It considers how meaningful or valuable the information presented in the text is to the reader's needs, interests or concerns.

5.1. THE PERCEPTION OF TEXT 1

(I) The category ‘text readability’

In the Estonian-language informational text, 47% of respondents found it quite easy to read, while in the Russian-language text, 33% of respondents shared the same opinion. In both languages, 27% of readers considered the text easily readable, but a significant 30% of Russian-language text readers found it quite difficult to read. Regarding the Estonian-language text, 17% perceived it as somewhat difficult to read. Since the text’s topic was traffic and speeding, a relatively common subject, further examination of the Russian-language text is needed to determine the causes of its readability challenges.

(II) The category ‘nature of the text’

To describe the nature of the text, respondents could choose from 8 options. The majority of responses leaned towards the ‘friendlier’ end of the scale. Only a small number of respondents felt that the text was commanding or threatening (4% ET, 9% RU, 1% ET, 0% RU). In both groups, the most selected option was ‘recommendation’ (30% ET, 43% RU), aligning with the intended message of the PBGB. Thus, the emotional attitude of the message was perceived as intended. A similar choice was made for ‘instructive/didactic’, although opinions of Estonian and Russian readers slightly diverged, with only 6% of Russian respondents considering the text as instructive and didactic compared to 15% of Estonian respondents. The perception of the text as simply friendly also differed between ET and RU respondents, with 27% of ET and 9% of RU respondents making that choice. Both groups found the first text more neutral than the second text, which is quite natural considering the content of the text and other options (13% ET, 18% RU), as the second text had a more explicit warning nature. Therefore, the text was mostly perceived as a recommendation, but overall, respondents predominantly chose softer, friendlier attitudes from the available options.

(III) The category ‘comprehensibility of the text’s content’

Despite the difficulties in text readability, respondents in both languages indicated that they understood the message of the text either very well (ET 62% and RU 48%) or rather well (ET 34%, RU 33%). The responses were generally unanimous, indicating that the respondents found the

text's message easily understandable. About 9% of Russian-speaking readers were uncertain about whether they understood the message or not, while only 2% of Estonian-speaking respondents expressed uncertainty. Additionally, 9% of Russian-speaking readers stated that they only partially understood the text, compared to 1% of Estonian-speaking respondents. One Estonian-speaking reader did not understand the text at all. In summary, the message was slightly less comprehensible in the Russian-language text, but overall, both groups understood the text equally well.

(IV) The category 'understanding the purpose of the text's message'

The text aimed to encourage reporting places where speed limits are frequently violated. Slightly over half of the respondents in both groups believed that the purpose of the text was to uphold their safety (ET 52%, RU 56%). Meanwhile, 33% of Estonian-speaking readers and 27% of Russian-speaking readers interpreted the text as offering recommendations on how to act, but in a suggestive and instructive manner. A slightly smaller proportion of respondents (9% ET and 7% RU) chose the more specific option of 'changing my behaviour' compared to the previous interpretation. Only a few individuals perceived the text as a scare tactic with consequences (3% ET and 4% RU), while 3% of Estonian-speaking readers and 7% of Russian-speaking readers chose 'other' as their response.

(V) The category 'impact of the text's message on the reader's behaviour'

This category aimed to assess whether the text prompted the reader to take action. Actual behaviour in a similar situation may differ from what is anticipated and the responses varied. Among Estonian-speaking readers (ET 33%), the majority believed that they would respond to the message's call. The most popular response among Russian-speaking readers was 'cannot say' (RU 33%). On the other hand, in this group, more respondents stated that they would definitely act compared to the ET group (ET 19%, RU 30%). In the ET group, 17% believed that they would rather not act after reading the message and 6% were quite certain about it. In the RU group, these responses were less common: 6% chose 'probably will not act' and 3% selected 'do not intend to act'.

(VI) The category ‘importance of the text’s message for the reader’

Regarding the importance of the message, 45% of ET respondents found the message quite relevant and 18% considered it very relevant. In the RU group, the trend was similar but, compared to the ET respondents, slightly more found the message very relevant (RU 27%) and slightly fewer found it quite relevant (RU 39%). 17% of Estonian-speaking and 12% of Russian-speaking readers could not say whether the message was important to them or not and 15% of both groups believed that the message was not particularly relevant to them. 5% of the ET respondents and 6% of the RU respondents did not consider the message to be relevant at all and felt that it did not concern them. Among the reasons for deeming the message important, general safety was the overwhelming factor, deemed relevant by 76% of the ET respondents and 58% of the RU respondents. The safety of loved ones and oneself was generally considered equally important by both ET and RU readers, at 10% and 12%, respectively. However, a greater difference can be observed in perceiving the authoritative role of the PBGB as an institution in delivering the message. 15% of RU respondents considered the impact of the message important due to it being an official message from the PBGB. Among Estonian-speaking respondents, only 7% considered the institutional role as a message deliverer important. As an additional note, among the reasons mentioned, the phrase ‘the safety of all of us’ was used, combining both the first and second response options. In one comment, the respondent expressed a desire to emphasise both general and personal safety. Two other comments expressed appreciation for such initiatives and speculated that this additional opportunity might motivate people to take more action.

5.2. THE PERCEPTION OF TEXT 2

(I) The category ‘text readability’

The majority of respondents indicated that the message was quite easy to read (ET 38% and RU 52%). Given that the proportion of RU respondents is 14% higher, it can be inferred that the Russian version of the text was more readable than the Estonian version. The proportion of

respondents who stated that the text was easy to read is relatively equal (ET 36% and RU 31%), suggesting that both text versions were generally readable. The proportion of respondents who found it somewhat difficult to read is also similar (ET 17% and RU 14%). Only 2% of respondents found it very difficult to read and they were all ET respondents (none of the RU respondents felt this way). The percentage of neutral responses is relatively equal, with 7% for ET and 3% for RU. It can be assumed that respondents who remained neutral may not have understood the criteria for readability or found it difficult to assess the text's readability. In terms of the readability of text 2, it can be concluded that it was easy or quite easy to read for both language groups.

(II) The category 'nature of the text'

When characterising the text's message, the majority of respondents recognised it as having a warning nature (ET 49% and RU 71%), despite the difference in proportions between ET and RU (22%). There are noticeable differences between ET and RU in perceiving the message of the text: 32% of ET respondents viewed the text as instructive-didactic (only 7% for RU) and 11% of RU respondents considered it a recommendation (only 6% for ET). A relatively small number of respondents (ET 4% and RU 7%) viewed the message of the text as friendly and well-intentioned. Only 4% of RU respondents perceived an imperative message in the text, while none of the ET respondents did. No one considered the message to be threatening. Only 7% of ET respondents perceived the text as neutral, while none of the RU respondents did. In their comments, respondents associated neutrality with the excessive length of the text or not understanding the meaning of the text. It cannot be ruled out that the text did not evoke any emotions in the respondents who did not justify their choice of response. Unlike the descriptive adjectives provided in the questionnaire to characterise the message of the text, only 2% of ET respondents chose the 'other' category. In describing the 'other' category of the message, respondents stated that they could not provide an assessment, they were not familiar with the subject matter or they did not belong to the target audience of the message. The warning nature of the message prevailed in this category.

(III) The category 'comprehensibility of the text's content'

The majority of respondents acknowledged that they understood the message of the text very well (ET 64% and RU 59%). Among respondents

who indicated that the message of the text was rather understandable, 29% were ET and 38% were RU. Here, a clear equality between ET and RU respondents is evident, suggesting that the text was understandable to both language groups. Only 2% of ET respondents partially understood or did not understand the text at all (0% for RU in both evaluation criteria). An equal number of respondents from both language groups remained neutral (ET 3% and RU 3%). It can be assumed that 3% of respondents had no comments on the content of the message. This could be due to uncertainty between the two options, a lack of clarity in the text's contents or a general disinterest in the content of the text. The clarity of the text's content prevailed in this category.

(IV) The category 'understanding the purpose of the text's message'

Both language groups understood the purpose of the text's message in a similar way: both ET (43%) and RU (38%) saw the message as upholding their safety and providing recommendations on how to act (ET 42% and RU 38%). 21% of RU respondents believed that the purpose of the message was to change behaviour, while in the ET group, this was only 9%. Both ET (3%) and RU (3%) respondents unanimously believed that the message was rather threatening with the possible consequences described in the text. 3% of ET respondents suggested the 'other' option, which means that the message was informative and cautionary, but at the same time confusing and not related to the respondent's safety because they were not dealing with the issue mentioned in the message (such as cryptocurrency). In this category, the predominant number of respondents saw the purpose of the message as supporting safety and providing specific instructions on how to act.

(V) The category 'impact of the text's message on the reader's behaviour'

In terms of willingness to change their behaviour, 58% of RU respondents and only 30% of ET respondents intended to act after reading the message. A smaller percentage of RU respondents (18%) were more likely to act, compared to 32% of ET respondents. Based on these results, it can be speculated that RU readers trust or express obedience to the police message more than ET readers, who weigh their options (30% and 32% respectively). The respondents' comments primarily emphasise the importance of cybersecurity and the usefulness of PBGB's

recommendations. Approx. 10% of ET respondents and 3% of RU respondents are less likely to change their behaviour after reading the message, while a similar number of respondents in both language groups (7% ET and 6% RU) do not intend to take action after reading the text. The comments indicated that some respondents believe that they are already well informed about cyber threats, while others abstain from cryptocurrency and consequently, do not take any action. It can be concluded that respondents take action based on their interest in the PBGB message. 15% of ET respondents and 3% of RU respondents remained neutral. The comments from respondents in this category were similar to the previous option concerning behaviour change: an awareness of the dangers and a lack of interest in the problem. In this category, a larger portion of respondents indicated a willingness to change their behaviour.

(VI) The category ‘importance of the text’s message for the reader’

The responses in the previous category are closely aligned with the results of the category assessing the relevance of the message. 30% of ET respondents and 24% of RU respondents deemed the message to be very relevant to themselves, while 39% of ET and 56% of RU respondents considered it to be quite relevant. Comments from respondents can be divided into four groups:

- Emphasising the importance of informative text for society, enhancing public safety and awareness;
- Advocating the occasional reminder to citizens about cyber threats;
- Sharing negative personal experiences as IT users, particularly related to malware;
- Providing specific instructions on how to take action.

17% of ET respondents and 4% of RU respondents deemed the message to be quite irrelevant. The reasons given in the comments can be divided into two categories: a lack of awareness and a lack of interest in the topic. 5% of ET respondents and 12% of RU respondents directly stated that they were not interested in or affected by the message. 9% of ET respondents and 4% of RU respondents took a neutral position

and their comments provided the same reasons: an awareness of cyber threats and a lack of interest in the problem. A larger number of respondents (55% of ET and 52% of RU) chose general safety as the reason for the importance of informative text. The justifications provided by the respondents mainly revolved around two aspects: the constant relevance of cyber threats and the importance of cybersecurity. 31% of ET respondents and 24% of RU respondents stated that the informative text would personally affect them or their families. The reasons given included three aspects: improving IT skills, concern for oneself and loved ones and personal financial considerations. A relatively small number of respondents (8% of ET and 17% of RU) cited the official nature of the PBGB message as a reason for its importance. The justification given is a reliable source. This low result may suggest that respondents have less institutional trust or a critical attitude not only toward the PBGB but also toward other state institutions. It cannot be ruled out that the negative results in the category of behaviour change indicate the same underlying reason. 5% of ET respondents and 3% of RU respondents did not deem the informative text to be relevant to themselves and 2% of ET and 3% of RU respondents chose the 'other' response option, citing awareness of cyber hygiene as the reason. In this category, two dominant aspects were general safety and personal interest in the message.

5.3. THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF INFORMATIONAL TEXTS 1 AND 2

Two texts were compared and their readability was analysed among different language groups (ET and RU readers). In terms of readability assessment, the first text exhibited the largest difference. Reading the text was quite difficult for RU readers, as indicated by 30% of the respondents. On the other hand, reading the text was quite easy for ET readers, as acknowledged by 47% of the respondents. The second text, was relatively easy to read for the majority of RU readers (52% of the respondents), whereas only 38% of ET readers chose the same response. However, contradictory results are evident. For instance, in the case of text 1, 27% of ET readers found it easy to read, whereas for text 2, this figure was 36%. However, when considering the response 'quite easy to read', the results are reversed: 47% for text 1 and 38% for text 2 among

ET readers. Among RU readers, the responses for both ‘easy to read’ and ‘quite easy to read’ for text 2 are consistent (31% and 52%, respectively) and there are no contradictions. In conclusion, the results indicate that reading the first text was more difficult for Russian speakers compared to Estonian speakers. In contrast, reading the second text was easier for Russian speakers compared to Estonian speakers. These differences may indicate variations in the complexity and style level of the texts.

In the category of text comprehensibility, the results are relatively equal, except for the results of text 1: 62% of ET readers and 48% of RU readers understood the text very well, while 34% of ET readers and 33% of RU readers understood it to some extent. The results in this category correlate with the indicators of text readability by language communities: if the text was easy to read, the message was also understandable.

When characterising the texts, ET and RU respondents mostly reached a consensus: text 1 is viewed as a recommendation (ET 30% and RU 42%) and text 2 is regarded as a warning (ET 49% and RU 71%), except for the response options ‘friendly, well-intentioned’ and ‘instructive, didactic’. While 27% of ET readers perceived the message of text 1 as friendly and well-intentioned, only 9% of RU readers shared this view. Similarly, 32% of ET readers deemed the message of Text 2 as instructive and didactic, while only 7% of RU readers shared this view.

Both language groups’ understanding of the texts’ objectives was relatively consistent. Text 1 was perceived as promoting one’s safety by 52% of ET readers and 56% of RU readers, while 33% of ET readers and 27% of RU readers considered it as providing recommendations. Text 2 was perceived equally, with 43% of ET readers and 38% of RU readers considering it as promoting safety and 42% of ET readers and 38% of RU readers considering it as providing recommendations.

The impact of the message of text 1 on the behaviour of readers from both language groups was relatively similar: 33% of ET readers and 27% of RU readers would probably take action, while 19% of ET readers and 30% of RU readers would definitely take action. For the same text, 26% of ET readers and 33% of RU readers were unsure about their response. For text 2, there was a noticeable difference in the response option ‘will definitely act’ (30% for ET readers and 58% for RU readers), indicating

that the message of text 2 appeared more convincing to RU respondents. In the response option 'probably will act', 32% of ET readers and 18% of RU readers chose it, while 15% of ET readers and 3% of RU readers were unsure about their response.

Both language groups equally recognised the relevance of text 1: 45% of ET respondents and 39% of RU respondents deemed the message quite relevant, while 18% of ET respondents and 27% of RU respondents deemed it very relevant. 15% of ET respondents and 15% of RU respondents deemed the message of text 1 to be less relevant. For text 2, 30% of ET respondents and 24% of RU respondents deemed the message to be very relevant, while 39% of ET respondents and 56% of RU respondents saw it as more relevant. Only 17% of ET respondents and 4% of RU respondents deemed the message of text 2 as less important.

Most ET and RU readers found the message of both texts to be important because of their relevance to general safety: For text 1, it was 76% of ET respondents and 58% of RU respondents and for text 2, it was 55% of ET respondents and 52% of RU respondents. The perception of message importance was similar across language communities, but there were differences between the two texts. Text 2 resonated more with readers and their close ones (31% ET and 24% RU) compared to text 1 (10% ET and 12% RU). As an official message from the PBGB, 7% of ET respondents and 15% of RU respondents considered text 1 relevant, while for text 2, it was 8% of ET respondents and 17% of RU respondents. This suggests that the official message from a government agency is more important to RU respondents than to ET respondents.

The results indicate that reading the first text was more challenging for RU respondents compared to ET respondents while reading the second text was easier for RU participants than for ET participants. This can be attributed to the differences in text complexity and style. In the category of comprehensibility, the results were generally similar, except for the first text, where ET participants had a higher percentage of 'very well understood' compared to RU participants. The comprehensibility results align with the readability results: when a text was easy to read, the message was also better understood.

In characterising the texts, respondents largely agreed, with some variations between the language groups observed in specific response choices. Both language groups perceived text 1 as a recommendation, while text 2 was seen as a warning. The differences emerge in response to the choices of ‘friendly, well-intentioned’ and ‘instructive, didactic’, where RU respondents had different reactions compared to ET participants.

The understanding of the texts’ objectives was generally consistent among respondents of both language groups: Both text 1 and text 2 were perceived as upholding one’s safety and providing recommendations.

The impact of the texts on behaviour displayed relative similarity among participants in both language groups, except for text 2, where RU respondents more frequently chose the option ‘will definitely act’. Both language groups acknowledged the importance of the texts, but there were some distinctions between them. Overall, the results indicate that the perception patterns of both texts are generally similar among the two language groups, with no significant differences. The observed variations may be attributed to differences in linguistic complexity and stylistic inconsistencies between the Estonian and Russian versions of the texts.

6. DISCUSSION: PERCEPTION OF INFORMATION TEXTS IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGES

The study analysed the reception messages of police announcements among Estonian and Russian-speaking target groups. The study found that the Estonian and Russian versions of information texts disseminated by the Estonian police were perceived somewhat differently within the target communities but not to the extent that would cause any confusion or unexpected behaviour in either. The linguistic analysis of the texts showed that both texts had an instructive and guiding nature.

The study employed various categories to analyse the perception of the two information texts. These categories encompass readability, the nature of the text, comprehensibility of the text’s content, understanding of the aim of the text’s message, impact on the reader’s behaviour and the significance of the text’s message for the reader. The analysis offered

an insight into how the texts were received among different language communities and identified potential strengths and weaknesses in the comprehensibility and effectiveness of the police messages.

The analysis of the first text revealed that the Estonian text was perceived as fairly easy to read by 47% of respondents, while the Russian text was deemed so by only 33% of respondents. Both texts were characterised as friendly and advisory and both language groups understood the message well. Most respondents felt that the purpose of the text was to support their safety and guide their actions. The importance of the text's message was recognised by both Estonian and Russian readers and some respondents indicated a willingness to act as per the instructions or recommendations provided.

The analysis of the second text showed that respondents from both language groups generally found it readable. The Russian text was perceived as slightly easier to read and the majority of respondents saw the message as a warning. The purpose of the text was seen as upholding one's safety and behaviour change. Russian-speaking respondents showed a greater willingness to change their behaviour compared to Estonian-speaking respondents. The importance of the information text, its significance to society and the awareness of cyber threats were recognised, although some respondents did not deem the text important or personally relevant. Overall, safety and personal interest in the message were crucial aspects of how the text was perceived.

CONCLUSIONS

The study aimed to analyse the reception and differences in understanding and interpretation of informational texts delivered in two languages within Estonian and Russian-speaking target groups. The study revealed variations in the perception of Estonian and Russian versions of these texts. The analysis showed that the texts had an instructive and guiding nature; supportive, rather than giving direct orders. Various categories were used to analyse the perception of the texts, including readability, the nature of the text, comprehensibility of the content, understanding the aim of the message, impact on the reader's behaviour and relevance

for the reader. The analysis provided an overview of how the texts were received among respondents from the two language communities, identifying strengths and potential issues in their comprehensibility and effectiveness. The study found variations in the level of difficulty in reading the texts between respondents from the Estonian and Russian language groups. The first text posed more challenges for Russian readers, while the second text was easier to comprehend. Respondents from both language groups perceived the texts as advisory, aiming at promoting safety and providing recommendations. The impact on probable behaviour was relatively similar for the first text, but in the case of the second text, Russian readers expressed a greater willingness to take action. The relevance of the texts was acknowledged by respondents from both language groups, with some variations between the texts.

All the aforementioned findings suggest potential areas for future research. Further studies could delve deeper into the linguistic and cultural factors influencing the reception of information texts. This could involve examining specific linguistic features such as sentence structures and vocabulary choices that contribute to differential perception among language communities. Additionally, studying the cultural nuances and context-specific factors that shape the interpretation of these texts could provide valuable insights. To enhance the effectiveness of information texts, several improvements can be considered. Customising the texts to the linguistic and cultural characteristics of the target communities can increase their comprehensibility and resonance. Collecting feedback from the target communities and involving them in the evaluation process can provide valuable insights for enhancing the effectiveness of future communication efforts.

In conclusion, despite the study's limited participants, which was determined by the research team's limited access to data from the broader target group, this study sheds light on the disparities in the reception of informational texts among Estonian and Russian-speaking communities. Further research should delve into linguistic and cultural factors, while improvements can be achieved by tailoring the texts and conducting feedback sessions and regular evaluations. Through the refinement of communication strategies, it's possible to enhance the clarity and effectiveness of informational texts, thereby fostering safer and more informed communities.

Contacts:

Elen Laanemaa, MA

Estonian Academy of Security Sciences

E-mail: elen.laanemaa@sisekaitse.ee

Aida Hatšaturjan, PhD

Estonian Academy of Security Sciences

E-mail: aida.hatsaturjan@sisekaitse.ee

Marju Taukar, PhD

Estonian Academy of Security Sciences

E-mail: marju.taukar@sisekaitse.ee

Kerli Linnat, MA

Estonian Academy of Security Sciences

E-mail: kerli.linnat@sisekaitse.ee

Veronika Ehrenbusch, MA

Estonian Academy of Security Sciences

E-mail: veronika.ehrenbusch@sisekaitse.ee

REFERENCES AND SOURCES

- Bourdieu P., 1991. *Language and symbolic power*. Trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Denscombe, M., 2010. *The good research guide: For small-scale social research*. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education; Open University Press.
- Denzin, N, Lincoln, Y., 1994. *Handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications Inc.
- Fairclough, N., 2001. *Language and Power* (2nd ed.). London: Longman.
- Galperin, I.R., 2007 = Гальперин, И.Р. Текст как объект лингвистического исследования [Text as an object of linguistic research], Москва: КомКнига.
- Halliday, M.A.K., Matthiessen, C.M.I.M., 2004. *An introduction to functional grammar*, 3rd edition. London: Routledge.
- Hennoste, T., 2018. 'Keel, võim ja vaim'. ['Language, power and mind']. *Universitas Tartuensis*, 4, 46-47.
- Brown, R.W., Lenneberg, E.H., 1954. 'A study in language and cognition'. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 49(3), 454–462. Retrieved from <<https://doi.org/10.1037/h0057814>>. Accessed on 20 June 2023.
- Gumperz, J.J., Levinson, S.C., 1996. *Rethinking linguistic relativity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Internal Security Development Plan 2020-2030 = Siseturvalisuse arengukava 2020-2030. Siseministerium. Retrieved from <<https://www.siseministerium.ee/stak2030>>. Accessed on 20 June 2023.
- Kasik, R., 2002. 'Lingvistiline tekstianalüüs' ['Linguistic text analysis']. *Tartu Ülikooli üldkeeleteaduse õppetooli toimetised: Teoreetiline keeleteadus Eestis*, 4, 74-88.
- Kasik, R., 2007. 'Võimu keel: Asutus suhtleb kodanikuga' ['Power language: Institution communicating with citizens']. *Eesti Rakenduslingvistika Ühingu aastaraamat*, 3, 167-176.
- Kamenskaya, O.L. 1990 = Каменская, О.Л. Текст и коммуникация [Text and communication]. Москва: Высшая школа.
- Kolshanski, G.V. 2007 = Колшанский, Г.В. Коммуникативная функция и структура языка [The communicative function and structure of language]. Москва: Издательство ЛКИ.
- Komissarov, V.N., 1990 = Комиссаров, В.Н. Теория перевода: Лингвистические аспекты [Translation theory: Linguistic aspects]. Москва: Высшая школа.
- Kramsch, C., 2016. 'The multiple faces of symbolic power'. *Applied Linguistics Review*, 7(4), 517–529.

- Kramersch, C., 2020. *Language as symbolic power*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kumar, R., 2011. *Research methodology*, 3rd edition. London: SAGE.
- Pajusalu, R., Tragel, I., Veismann, A., Vija, M., 2004. *Tuumsõnade semantikat ja pragmaatikat [Semantics and pragmatics of core vocabulary]*. Tartu Ülikooli üldkeeleteaduse õppetooli toimetised, 5, Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
- Prevention Work Concept, 2018 = Ennetustöö kontseptsioon, 2018. Tallinn: Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet. Retrieved from <<https://www.politsei.ee/files/Ennetus/politsei-ja-piirivalveameti-ennetust-kontseptsioon-sept-2018-.pdf?40da87a884>>. Accessed on 20 June 2023.
- Tiit, E.-M., Makarova, M., 2020. 'Eestlased koroonakriisis: Eesti elanike kohanemine koroonakriisist tingitud piirangutega ja hoiakute muutumine kriisiperioodil' ['Estonians in the COVID-19 crisis: Adaptation of Estonian residents to restrictions and changing attitudes during the crisis period']. *Akadeemia*, 9 (38), Tartu, 1539-1567.
- Vainik, E., 2012. 'Eesti keele sõnavara afektikalduvus ja mis sellega peale hakata' ['Affectiveness in Estonian vocabulary and how to deal with it']. *Keel ja Kirjandus*, 8-9, 644-657.
- Vanaisak, Ü., 2018. *Politsei käsiraamat [The Police Handbook]*. Tallinn: Sisekaitseakadeemia.

APPENDIX 1. A QUESTIONNAIRE WITH TEXTS 1 AND 2 TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY THE AUTHORS SPECIFICALLY FOR THIS PAPER.

Dear Estonian citizen! We invite you to answer a questionnaire by the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences exploring the reception and comprehension of the messages by the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board. Answering the questionnaire takes about 15 minutes and it is anonymous. In case you wish to participate in a draw for 30 bookshop vouchers worth 10 euros each, please write your e-mail address at the end of the questionnaire. The answers should be submitted by 20 December 2022. We sincerely hope you will find the time to contribute! Estonian Academy of Security Sciences

Part A: General questions

This section includes questions about the respondent.

A1. Gender:

male

female

Do not wish to reveal

A2. Age:

18- 24

25- 44

45- 64

65- 74

75+

A3. Level of education:

basic education

secondary education

vocational education

higher education

other

Part B: Part I Please read the following text and answer the questions.

Message 1

Inform the police of places where speeding is a problem 5 September 2022 The Police and Border Guard Board is waiting for observations on locations where drivers constantly exceed the speed limit to be posted at www.liiklustalgud.ee. Based on the given information, the police will conduct speed checks on 22 September. Police Lieutenant Colonel Sirle Loigo invites all people to register their observations on the map application as traffic safety needs everyone's contribution. "The *Liiklustalgud* event will focus on speeding as it is the most pressing problem in traffic at the moment. Following the speed limit is highly important in preventing tragic consequences. Especially now that there are more drivers and children starting their school in traffic," Loigo stresses. The aim of *Liiklustalgud* is to take action by involving the community, make people think about the safety of their neighbourhood and understand the dangers of speeding. "It allows everyone to contribute to traffic safety by letting us know of places where following the speed limit is a problem. It is excessive speed that is the main cause of traffic accidents resulting in serious injuries or death. With the event, we steer drivers to think if the few seconds they gain is worth putting their own and other people's life at risk," the police officer added. Additions on the map application can be made until Friday, September 9. This year, the *Liiklustalgud* event will take place for the sixth time.

Annika Maksimov PBGB press officer 5655771

B1. 1. Was it easy or difficult to read the text?1- It was very difficult to read it. 2- It was quite difficult to read it. 3- Cannot say. 4- It was quite easy to read it. 5- It was easy to read it. **B2. 2. How would you characterise the message of the text? Please explain.**Warning Threatening Commanding Neutral Friendly, well-intentioned Recommendation Instructive, didactic other **B3. Please explain:**

B4. 3. Did you understand the content of the message? (select on the scale 1-5)

- 1- did not understand at all
- 2 -I understood partially
- 3 - cannot say
- 4 - I rather understood
- 5 – I understood very well

B5. 4. The aim of the message was to:

- 1 - uphold my safety
- 2 - give recommendations on how to act
- 3 - change my behaviour
- 4 - frighten me with the possible consequences
- 5 – other

B6. Please explain:

B7. 5. Will you act after reading the message?

- 1 - I do not intend to act
- 2 - I probably will not act
- 3 - cannot say
- 4 - I probably will act
- 5 – I will definitely act

B8. Please explain:

B9. 6. How relevant is the message for you?

- 1 - the message does not interest / concern me
- 2 - quite irrelevant
- 3 - cannot say
- 4 - quite relevant
- 5 – the message is very relevant to me/ I will definitely consider the message

B10. Please explain:

B11. 7. Why do you consider the message relevant?

- It is the official message sent by the Police and Border Guard Board
- The message concerns general safety
- The message concerns me and my family
- I do not find the message relevant
- other

B12. Please explain:

Part C: Part II Please read the following text and answer the questions.

Message 2 Police: Good Cyber-Hygiene Prevents Money from Disappearing Mysteriously 7 April 2022

Recently, there have been increasing cases of large sums of money disappearing from crypto-currency wallets. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that their devices, such as computers or cell phones, have been infected with malware. The police recently received a report that 60,000 euros had been transferred from the cryptocurrency wallet without the owner's knowledge. "To the owner's knowledge, he had not shared his passwords or other data with anyone. There are similar cases with losses varying from a few hundred to around twenty thousand euros," says Hannes Kelt, the Head of the Cyber and Economic Crime Division of the North Prefecture. These days, investing in cryptocurrency is nothing new and also scammers have discovered a quick way to make money off gullible people. "The seemingly mysterious thefts described above are possible only if the computer is infected with malware. For this, the owner does not even have to enter his data anywhere, clicking on a suspicious link is enough. Such links are spread, for instance, in social media, via e-mails, text messages or ads, but in reality they are not sent by a specific person but by a device infected with malware," Kelt added.

There are a few simple steps to keep in mind to prevent malware infection. "The most common requests accompanying malware-infected links are, for instance: "Is that you in this video?", similarly "Look what I found," with an active link attached. Before clicking on anything, we suggest you ask the sender if he really sent it and what could it be. It is worth being critical of opening and downloading unknown files," the police officer explains. Cybercrimes have been on the rise in the recent years and only good cyber-hygiene can prevent it. Annika Maksimov PBGB press officer 5655771

C1. 1. Was it easy or difficult to read the text?

- 1- It was very difficult to read it.
- 2- It was quite difficult to read it.
- 3- Cannot say.
- 4- It was quite easy to read it.
- 5- It was easy to read it.

C2. 2. How would you characterise the message of the text?
Please explain.

Warning

Threatening

Commanding

Neutral

Friendly, well-intentioned

Recommendation

Instructive, didactic

other

C3. Please explain:

C4. 3. Did you understand the content of the message? (select on the scale 1-5)

1 - did not understand at all

2 - I understood partially

3 - cannot say

4 - I rather understood

5 - I understood very well

C5. 4. The aim of the message was:

1 - uphold my safety

2 - give recommendations on how to act

3 - change my behaviour

4 - frighten me with the possible consequences

5 - other

C6. Please explain:

C7. 5. Will you act after reading the message?

1 - I do not intend to act

2 - I probably will not act

3 - cannot say

4 - I probably will act

5 - I will definitely act

C8. Please explain:

C9. 6. How relevant is the message for you?

1 - the message does not interest me / the message does not concern me

2 - quite irrelevant

3 - cannot say

4 - quite relevant

5 - the message is very relevant to me/ I will definitely consider the message

C10. Please explain:

C11. 7. Why do you consider the message relevant?

It is the official message sent by the Police and Border Guard Board

The message concerns general safety

The message concerns me and my family

I do not find the message relevant

Other

C12. Please explain:

APPENDIX 2: ORIGINAL VERSIONS OF TEXTS 1 AND 2 IN ESTONIAN AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES.

TEXT 1 (IN ESTONIAN)

Anna politseile teada kohtadest, kus oled märganud kihutavaid juhte

05. september 2022

Politsei- ja piirivalveamet ootab veebilehel www.liiklustalgud.ee tähelepanekuid kohtadest, kus autojuhid pidevalt kiirust ületavad. Selle info alusel teeb politsei 22. septembril kiirustalgute raames liiklusjärelvalvet.

Politsei kolonelleitnant Sirle Loigo kutsub kõiki inimesi oma tähelepanekutest kaardirakenduses teada andma, sest turvaline liiklus vajab igaühe panust. „Talgud keskenduvad kiiruseületamisele, sest see on liikluses kõige põletavam probleem. Traagiliste tagajärgede ennetamiseks on piirikiiruse järgimine äärmiselt oluline. Seda eriti praegusel ajal, kui liikluses on rohkem autojuhte ja kooliteed alustanud lapsi,“ rõhutas Loigo.

Talgute eesmärk on kogukonda kaasates palju koos ära teha, panna inimesi mõtlema oma kodukoha turvalisusele ning mõistma kiiruse ületamise ohtlikkust.

„Talgud pakuvad igaühele võimaluse panustada liiklusturvalisusesse andes teada kohtadest, kus piirikiirusest kinnipidamine on probleemiks. Just liiga suur kiirus on raskete vigastustega või surmaga lõppenud liiklusõnnetuste peamine põhjus. Kiirustalgutega suuname juhid mõtlema, kas mõni sekund ajavõitu on ikka väärt enda ja teiste elu ohtu seadmist,“ lisas politseinik.

Tähelepanekuid kaardirakendusse oodatakse kuni reede, 9. septembrini. Liiklustalgud toimuvad sel aastal kuuendat korda.

TEXT 1 (IN RUSSIAN)**Сообщите полиции о местах, где вы заметили гоняющих водителей**

05 сентября 2022 г.

Департамент полиции и пограничной охраны ждет на веб-странице www.liiklustalgud.ee наблюдения о местах, где водители постоянно превышают скорость. На основании информации полиция 22 сентября в рамках дорожной толоки будет производить надзор за дорожным движением.

Подполковник полиции Сирле Лойгу призывает всех людей сообщать о своих наблюдениях в приложении, потому что безопасное дорожное движение нуждается во вкладе каждого.

«Толока сосредоточена на превышении скорости, поскольку это является самой острой проблемой в дорожном движении. Для предупреждения трагических последствий крайне важно придерживаться разрешенной скорости. Особенно сейчас, когда на дорогах больше водителей и школьников», – подчеркнула Лойго.

Цель толоки – с помощью сообщества многого добиться, заставить людей задуматься о безопасности своего родного края и опасности превышения скорости.

«Толока дает каждому возможность внести свой вклад в обеспечение безопасности дорожного движения, сообщив о местах, где превышение разрешенной скорости является проблемой. Именно слишком высокая скорость является основной причиной дорожных происшествий, закончившихся тяжелыми повреждениями или смертью. С помощью дорожных толок мы заставляем водителей задуматься, стоит ли ради нескольких выигранных секунд подвергать опасности свою жизнь и жизнь других людей», – добавила полицейский.

Наблюдения ожидаются в приложении до пятницы, 9 сентября. Дорожная толока проходит в этом году в шестой раз.

TEXT 2 (IN ESTONIAN)**Politsei: müstilise raha kadumise hoiab ära hea küberhügieen**

07. aprill 2022

Viimasel ajal on saagenud juhtumid, kus inimeste krüptorahakotist kaovad suured summad. Lähemalt uurides selgub, et nende seadmed nagu arvuti või mobiiltelefon on nakatunud pahavaraga.

Hiljuti laekus politseile avaldus, et krüptorahakotist on omaniku teadmata kantud edasi 60 000 eurot.

“Rahakoti omanik enda teada kellelegi oma paroolle või muid andmeid jaganud ei ole. Sääraseid juhtumeid on veel, kahjud on varieerunud paarisajast kuni paarikümne tuhande euroni,” kirjeldas Põhja prefektuuri küber- ja majanduskuritegude talituse juht Hannes Kelt.

Krüptorahasse investeerimine ei ole tänapäeval midagi uut ning ka kelmid on avastanud kiire võimaluse tulu teenimiseks kergeusklike inimeste pealt.

„Eelmainitud pealtnäha müstilised vargused on võimalikud siis, kui arvuti on nakatunud pahavaraga. Selleks ei pea rahaomanik isegi kuhugi oma andmeid sisestama, piisab vaid kahtlasele lingile vajutamisest. Taolisi linke edastatakse näiteks nii sotsiaalmeedias, e-kirja teel, SMS-i kui ka reklaamide kaudu, kuid tegelikult ei saada neid konkreetne inimene, vaid pahavaraga nakatunud seade,“ lisas Kelt.

Pahavaraga nakatumise vältimiseks on paar lihtsalt sammu, mida tasub meeles pidada. „Levinumad pahavaraga nakatanud linkidega kaasnevad üleskutsed on näiteks: „Kas siin videol oled sina?“ aga ka „Vaata, mis ma leidsin,“ mille juurde on lisatud aktiivne link. Enne kuhugi vajutamist soovitame saatjalt küsida, kas ta saatis selle lingi teadlikult ning millega võib olla tegu. Kriitiline tasub olla ka tundmatute failide avamisel ja ka alla laadimisel,“ selgitab politseinik.

Küberkuriteod on viimastel aastatel selges tõusutrendis ning nende vastu aitab ainult hea küberhügieen.

ТЕХТ 2 (IN RUSSIAN)**Полиция: хорошая кибергигиена защитит от мистического исчезновения денег**

07 апреля 2022 г.

В последнее время участились случаи, когда из криптовалютных кошельков пропадают крупные суммы. Выяснилось, что компьютер или мобильный телефон жертвы был заражен вредоносной программой.

Недавно полиция получила заявление о том, что из криптовалютного кошелька без ведома владельца было переведено 60 000 евро. “Владелец кошелька никому не передавал ни паролей, ни других данных. Были и другие похожие случаи, суммы ущерба варьировались от пары сотен до пары десятков тысяч евро”, – рассказал руководитель службы экономических и киберпреступлений Пыхьяской префектуры Ханнес Кельт.

Инвестирование в криптовалюту довольно распространено и мошенники также открыли для себя возможность быстро заработать на доверчивых людях.

„Такие на первый взгляд мистические пропажи денег возможны лишь в случае, когда компьютер заражен вредоносной программой. Для этого владелец криптовалюты даже не должен сам вводить куда-то свои данные, достаточно нажать на подозрительную ссылку, которые распространяются, например, в социальных сетях, мессенджерах, по э-почте, СМС и через рекламу. Такие ссылки рассылает не конкретный человек, а зараженные вредоносной программой компьютеры или мобильные телефоны“, – добавил Кельт.

Чтобы избежать заражения вредоносной программой, надо помнить простые правила. „Самый распространенный способ распространения вирусов – зараженные вирусом ссылки рассылаются в мессенджерах с фразами „Kas siin videol oled sina?“ (Это ты на этом видео?) или „Vaata, mis ma leidsin“ (Посмотри, что я нашел), за этим следует активная ссылка. Но до того, как нажать на ссылку,

спросите у человека, который ее выслал, прислал ли он вам эту ссылку сознательно и что это за ссылка. Осторожность следует соблюдать и тогда, когда вы получаете неизвестные файлы, нельзя загружать и открывать такие файлы“, – сказал Ханнес Кельт.

Количество киберпреступлений в последние годы выросло и защититься от них поможет только хорошая кибергигиена.