

DIANA MARNOT

COMPARISON OF SECURITY POLICY DOCUMENTS OF THE BALTIC STATES



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Front cover image: 30th Anniversary of the Baltic Chain on August 23, 2019,
balticcreators.com

Layout: Jan Garshnek

Language editor: Reili Argus

Translated in Multilingua Tõlkebüroo OÜ

ISBN 978-9985-67-329-4 (pdf)

www.sisekaitse.ee/kirjastus



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INTRODUCTION

The Baltic states are similar in their small size and common recent history. Similar concerns are shared, and the security of all three countries is based on the alliance of the European Union and NATO. The following is a general overview of how the three Baltic states have so far assessed the factors affecting their security environments. In addition, different types of risk mitigation measures by country are presented. It is based on the assumption that a region with common threats could share similar strategic goals, which would increase the security of both an individual country and the region as a whole in the future.

This overview outlines, by category, the national security policies and threat mitigation measures in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. To this end, the strategic documents of the security policy of the three Baltic states have been examined by way of thematic analysis: National Security Concept of Estonia (2004, 2010, 2017), Latvia's National Security Concept (2008, 2019) and Lithuania's National Security Strategy (2002, 2012, 2017). Although each country has more security-related documents, the above-mentioned documents were chosen in order to describe the thematic areas on a similar basis. The sample was also based on the availability of documents in English. In Latvia, for example, updated documents are issued every four years, but no official translations are made. Time limits were set by the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York, which changed the global security environment.

Although the Development Plan of Internal Security is the most comprehensive in the context of security, there are no analogies in either Latvia or Lithuania. There are more documents on different aspects of security in each country, but they cannot be compared on a common basis. Therefore, for example, the field of defense was not analyzed, because in each country, there are political documents, threat assessments and official explanations describing this topic in more detail than the documents examined in this paper. For the same reason, the issue of digital security has not been addressed, as it would require a more detailed analysis through various cybersecurity strategies. Further research and more detailed analysis can be made on the basis of this study.

The analysis of the documents is based on the lines of action set out in the National Security Concept of Estonia. The threats identified in both Latvia and Lithuania and their mitigation measures were grouped under these lines of action. The overview is also structured according to the lines of action. The structure of the work has followed the principle that the chapter on a specific thematic area sets out the cross-cutting themes and main views of each country. The chapters do not have a uniform structure: while the pervasive topics of the documents could be categorized, the emphasis on specific themes varied from country to country. If something was important in the case of Lithuania, for example, and it was described at length, then the same information may not be available in the Latvian document. The analysis also does not follow a strict time frame, but rather provides a thematic overview.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE BALTIC STATES

The security environment of the Baltic states is related to international development, and the main security threats are cross-border (see Annexes 1–3). Hence the need to ensure both regional and global security stability. For example, in 2017, it is described in Latvia's National Security Concept (hereinafter NSC) that the immediate threats to the country depend on the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area and the relations between the countries in the neighboring region. In addition, Estonia's 2017 NSC identifies asymmetric threats that do not recognize national borders and whose sources are difficult to identify. At the same time, their impact is equivalent to traditional security threats.

Following the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, Islamic terrorism has become a constant threat in the Western world. Countries with changing governance in the Middle East and North Africa pose a constant terrorist threat to the West, which, according to all documents, is one of the pervasive factors affecting security throughout the Baltics. In the European context, terrorism can be considered one of the major security threats affecting ordinary citizens due to its unpredictability. Although terrorist attacks are not a new phenomenon in the context of the world or history, they do affect the general sense of social security. The Baltic region takes into account what is happening in Europe. There have been dozens of attacks in Europe over the last two decades: Attacks on Madrid trains in 2004, London bombings in 2005, shootings at the Frankfurt airport in 2011, terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, terrorist attacks in Brussels in 2016 and a Paris knife attack in 2018.

All the Baltic states have highlighted global crises and uneven social development as security threats in their documents. For example, as described in the Lithuanian document (National Security Strategy, 2012), the main security threat was caused by multi-level global and regional instability. The main levels of threat were due to political and economic factors and social instability. During the period under review, Europe was most affected by the Arab Spring, which began in late 2010, with the execution of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and the start of civil war in Libya, Syria and Yemen. The above-mentioned events spurred an international wave of refugees, the consequences of which will be felt throughout the next decade.

The biggest external threat of the Baltic region in the last decade is related to Russia. The latter has used military, political, diplomatic, information, and economical means to achieve its goals. In addition to strengthening its armed forces, Russia has also increased its military presence both in the Baltic Sea region and near the borders of the Baltic states. Russia's aggressive and provocative actions are reflected, for example, in air border violations, offensive military exercises and also nuclear threats. In addition, Russia poses a threat to the entire Euro-Atlantic region, as it has the capability and readiness to use different types of weapons: military, economic, energy or information-related and other

such non-military means of influence. (Latvia's National Security Concept, 2017; Lithuania's National Security Strategy, 2017)

There have been several situations of conflict, crisis, and war in Russia in the European region. The direct aggressions were the war in Georgia in 2008 and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war from 2014 until this day. Indirect conflicts include the riots of April 2007 (incl. the attack on the Estonian Embassy in Moscow) and the abduction of an Estonian security police officer in 2014. In the global context, Russia has also shown itself to be capable in the digital field. Since Russia's cyberattacks on Estonia during the riots of April 2007, all the Baltic states have added cyber threats to their documents as a factor influencing security.

In National Security Concept of **Estonia**, the threats affecting the security environment have changed over the years (see Annex 1), but the goal of ensuring security has remained the same. According to the 2004 document, the goal of the state is to preserve "... Estonia's independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and national security." To this end, it is necessary to prevent and combat security threats. The purpose of creating security is to guarantee human rights, fundamental freedoms and the realization of the basic human values that determine the way of life of the people of a country. In addition, democratic principles ensure the sustainable development of society by strengthening civil society and the will to defend, and by promoting the country's international position. (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010)

As international crises and conflicts and the effects of globalization affect Estonia more and more directly, the goal is to find solutions that would be useful for other countries as well (Fundamentals of Security Policy, 2017; National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010). It is essential to maintain a rules-based world order based on international law and the UN Charter. To this end, it is considered necessary to provide development aid and protect human rights. All of this is strongly supported at the international level. Compared to other Baltic countries, it is unique for Estonia to stand up for human rights in the virtual world and to consider free access to the Internet important.

According to **Latvian** documents (Latvia's National Security Concept, 2008; Latvia's National Security Concept, 2019), a stable internal political environment, socio-economic situation, appropriate development of the Defense Forces, an up-to-date crisis management model, improvement of the civil defense system, public support for security policy, adherence to international standards and commitments, and consistent transatlantic cooperation at the political, economic, security and defense levels ensure a reasonable level of security for the country. As threats to Latvia are mostly global (see Annex 2), such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental threats, international cooperation is playing an increasingly important role in mitigating them. No country can stand up to these threats alone. The country takes into account the small size of its territory and population and has set itself the goal of participating as actively as possible in the development of international security policy.

Latvia's national security policy is a set of measures aimed at detection, prevention, and deterrence. The spectrum of security threats exceeds the competence of the authorities of the national defense and internal security system. This means that in order to detect, prevent and overcome threats to national security, the state must involve all public administration institutions. Given the large number of agencies involved, centralized control of national security policy and cooperation between these agencies is essential.

The factors threatening **Lithuania** have mostly remained the same in the descriptions of the strategies (see Annex 3). Lithuania's vital interests are sovereignty and territorial

integrity, a constitutional order based on democracy, civil society, human rights, citizens' rights of expression, and peace and national prosperity. National security is the basis of a country's prosperity because only a secure environment can ensure the functioning of a mature and sustainable constitutional order. Internal stability and development are based on improving socio-economic conditions. This includes the development of public security, the stability of foreign trade, the acceleration of privatization, social campaigns against economic crime, the development of civil society, the general development of culture and society, and full integration into international economic and cultural cooperation.

Lithuania's security is also affected by threats from neighboring countries, including human rights violations and the lack of fundamental freedoms. For example, in 2020, Belarus is the only European country with the death penalty and no freedom of expression in line with Western values. According to Lithuania's strategy for the next period under review, 2017, the main challenges stemmed from what was happening at the EU-NATO border: mass migration and the resulting humanitarian crisis, the growing terrorist threat, organized crime, and the supply of strategically important goods. Most of these threats can be traced back to the migration crisis that began in the Arab Spring.

DIPLOMACY

Estonia's position both before and after joining the European Union (EU) and NATO was that Euro-Atlantic cooperation is the biggest guarantor of the country's security environment. Since the 2010 NSC, it has been confirmed that the strongest security guarantee for Estonia is NATO, and therefore active activities are also a national priority. Through NATO, Estonia considers security cooperation with the United States important, whose presence in Europe is important for the Baltic region. In addition, Estonia considers cooperation with organizations dealing specifically with security issues to be important in ensuring global and regional security and stability. Particular attention will be paid to conflict prevention and the UN's ability to address global challenges. Estonia also supports the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and increases its capacity to participate in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CNFC). The NSC of 2010 confirms its contribution to "... military and civilian crisis management operations of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)." The implementation of security policy is based on the EU's common goals and objectives. However, unlike in Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has not specifically mentioned increasing cooperation and active participation in shaping the security policy of the respective organizations.

It is important for Estonia to restrict conventional weapons in Europe, which is why it desires to participate in international arms control agreements. The NSC of 2010 emphasizes the importance for the state "... to prevent the smuggling or illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their components from their territory".

The NSC of 2004 confirms that Estonia has good relations with the Nordic countries (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania). Close cooperation with these countries has helped the Estonian economy and strengthened the country's defense capability. In addition, Baltic cooperation takes place through the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Council of Ministers, and a tripartite defense cooperation agreement has been concluded. Estonia is interested in intensifying Nordic-Baltic security cooperation both in the Baltic Sea region and more broadly. Estonia wants open dialogue and practical cooperation with Russia.

Latvia's foreign policy is aimed at defending its national interests in rapidly changing circumstances, such as international politics, globalization, extremism, and climate change. The 2008 document sets out a clear direction for active participation in the activities of international organizations. Immediately after becoming a member, the laws began to be improved, as a result of which national security was improved. The aim was systematically to participate as actively, constructively and on an equal footing as possible in the development of the security policy of international organizations. This enabled Latvia to strengthen its independence, security and increase economic growth, as this protected

their national interests in the wider world. Participation in shaping the external relations of international organizations has given Latvia a much greater opportunity to change external conditions in its own favor. In addition, influential international positions help to hedge important security threats for their country. Latvia's goal has been to help the international community politically, militarily, socio-economically, and with the help of experts.

Latvia's National Security Concept in 2019 confirms that the most important international goals have been achieved as a result of becoming a full member of NATO and the EU. In addition, the country must encourage the further involvement of other international organizations, such as the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, in stabilizing the international security situation, with a view to finding solutions to the crisis in Ukraine and developing democracy and European values. The sustainable development of the state and society, which also includes the continuous development and strengthening of the Latvian language and culture, was pointed out as the guarantee of state security.

For **Lithuania**, the stable and multifaceted development of NATO is the most important security guarantee. The national goal is to increase NATO cooperation, and special attention has been paid to the development of the organization's rapid reaction force. In cooperation with NATO, Lithuania has focused on the fight against hybrid threats, energy and cybersecurity, and strategic communication. Like other Baltic states, Lithuania relies to a large extent on NATO's deterrence, and as a result, the permanent presence of Allied forces in the country is highly desirable. In addition, it is desired that NATO be active in neighboring countries, which in turn will ensure the security of the Lithuanian state. At the same time, it is said separately that although NATO membership is a good guarantee of security, it is still necessary to develop one's own independent defense capability. In this way, the aim is to find a balance between internal defense development and international commitments.

The European Union is the main economic security guarantee for Lithuania, and active and responsible cooperation in the Union is considered important. A united EU should stand up for the fundamental interests of its Member States in a highly competitive international environment. The unity and solidarity of the Union should ensure the protection of all common interests, and the Union must also withstand complex geopolitical tensions. Therefore, active participation in the decision-making processes of the EU institutions is also an aim. The main areas of support that are considered important for integration are: the internal market, the single currency, the interconnection of energy and transport networks. It is considered important to fully integrate Lithuania's energy infrastructure with that of Europe. In addition, the development of the EU's foreign, defense and security policy is actively supported. Support is also provided for the development of the EU's hybrid resilience and the enlargement of the Union and for the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, which highlights the development of cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These countries are developing Western values (democracy, free-market economy, legitimacy, transparency and accountability, independent media and NGOs). In these countries, the experience of security cooperation is shared with the Baltic states. Migration and asylum policies aim to ensure that they do not affect or undermine the stability and unity of the EU.

Lithuania's strategic partners are Poland, Russia, and Belarus. Cooperation with Poland takes place at several levels: between parliaments, governments, various types of institutions, universities, local municipalities and NGOs. Particular attention is paid to Kaliningrad, where smuggling and socio-economic and environmental instability are the main

problems. These problems cause organized crime, uncontrolled migration to neighboring countries as well as environmental pollution. Good neighborly relations with Russia are desirable, but only if Russia complies with international law, respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries and complies with the Minsk Agreement. However, practical forms of cooperation with Russia have been maintained on issues important for Lithuania's national interests.

The Nordic and Baltic countries, whose cooperation would ensure the development of the region, are highlighted as important partners. As a result of joint cooperation between the eight countries, the common interests of all countries should be protected at the geopolitical level. The development of democratic values in the eastern neighborhood is also considered important. The United States, with which Lithuania wants to strengthen relations in the political, military, economic, energy, security, and cultural fields, is also mentioned as an important partner. Lithuania wants to strengthen strategic relations and cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Poland, especially in the fields of military, transport, energy security, etc. The aim is to develop joint infrastructure projects.

SECURITY OF THE LIVING ENVIRONMENT

The security of the **Estonian** living environment is primarily affected (Fundamentals of Security Policy, 2017; National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010) by the state of the natural environment and public health, socio-economic situation, emergency preparedness, smooth access to vital services, food, and drinking water, and the ability of society and individuals to cope independently in the event of disruption of vital services over a period of time. The risk mitigation measures are summarized in Table 1.

The main emergencies caused by natural disasters in Estonia are caused by storms and floods. In order to deal with emergencies, effective civil protection is being developed, which increases society's readiness to deal with crisis situations that can be reasonably foreseen and prepared for. The best way to achieve this is to raise public awareness of potential hazards and mitigation measures. (Fundamentals of Security Policy, 2017)

The improvement of the state of the environment is supported in Estonia by making the values and behavioral habits of the population more environmentally friendly through the development and implementation of pollution prevention measures, the use of natural resources and the reduction of waste. Estonia is implementing measures to prevent the spread of environmentally hazardous substances and to decontaminate land and sea pollution sources. (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010) In connection with environmental security, attention is also paid in Estonia to ensure that genetically modified organisms do not enter the environment in an uncontrolled manner. To that end, strict requirements are laid down for their import, risk analysis, labeling, monitoring and control. (Fundamentals of the Security Policy of the Republic of Estonia, 2004)

The living environment is also affected by socio-economic problems. Already in the 2004 NSC, it was emphasized that in order to ensure the country's social stability, it is important to address the labor market, "... implement a sustainable social security system covering at-risk groups and implement a sustainable social security system covering at-risk groups and to prepare a skilled workforce with sufficient volumes to ensure continued economic growth."

Measures to reduce the risks of climate change include monitoring, mitigating risks, and dealing with the consequences of climate change. To this end, cooperation is established with the international community, the local government level, the business and non-profit sector and the research community. International cooperation also includes ship traffic management and marine pollution monitoring. (Fundamentals of Security Policy, 2017; National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010)

As in neighboring countries, Estonia is also aware of possible radiation hazards. Older nuclear power plants in the Baltic Sea region are considered to be particularly dangerous. Estonia participates in international cooperation to increase radiation safety in the Baltic Sea region. An early warning system is in place that can detect radiological accidents in neighboring countries at an early stage. (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010)

The aim of public health protection is to ensure that people can cope with everyday life so that they can contribute to the social and economic development of the country. In this way, it is possible to increase the cohesion of society and, thus also the state's ability to cope with security threats. Typical measures to ensure public health are surveillance of communicable diseases, immunization plans, prevention of the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In addition, there are multifaceted programs to reduce the spread of drug addiction and limit the availability of drugs.

It is important for **Latvia** to develop several areas to ensure the security of the living environment (see Table 1). The key is to continuously improve environmental safety and emergency-related legislation. At the national level, it is also important to optimize the crisis management and civil defense system. Latvia has also set a special goal to properly develop civil-military cooperation. It is also important to increase preparedness to deal with emergencies and environmental disasters. The relevant authorities have a special role to play in forecasting environmental disasters. In addition, the Ministry of the Environment has had to set up a group of experts among its staff to draw up a disaster recovery plan. After forecasting and recovery, it is important for Latvia to develop a form of cooperation for the rapid exchange of relevant information. The strategic institutions that must be provided with alternative electricity supply in the event of a power outage are listed separately. The 2008 strategy also emphasizes support for the development of Latvia's national rapid response and medical support units and their readiness for international operations.

According to **Lithuania's** 2002 strategy, the security of the living environment is most affected by industrial accidents, natural disasters, epidemics, and environmental threats. In order to deal with them, the development of an emergency prevention and management system was started during the preparation of the document. Since then, the system has been constantly updated. The biggest cause of environmental threats is pollution in the transport, energy, and industrial sectors. Various measures are being taken to mitigate the risks arising from the above areas: reducing pollution in the transport sector, increasing energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy, and developing advanced technologies for pollution clean-up and recycling (see Table 1). In addition, air pollution standards are applied to prevent damage to health and the environment from poor air quality. Ensuring protection against radiation hazards is a priority for Lithuania. For environmental protection, the 2017 strategy has set the goal of implementing the environmental requirements of the EU's international conventions and protocols, ensuring the protection of radiation hazards, having an overview of radioactive environmental emissions, and monitoring the environment around nuclear power plants. In addition, Russia, and Belarus, together with the international community, are required to comply with nuclear and environmental requirements.

The security of the living environment is further reduced by low regional development and poverty. This is compounded by the demographic crisis caused by the declining Lithuanian population due to low birth rates, aging, and emigration. Uneven socio-economic development can lead to permanent or increasing differences in the living standards of social groups. This, in turn, can foster mistrust of state institutions and democratic political systems and provoke political extremism, crime or even social unrest. In this way,

Lithuania aims to improve social cohesion and the demographic situation. According to the 2017 strategy, it was important to harmonize regional development, as it can help reduce the socio-economic gap between people. The systematic development of regional cohesion with EU funding also serves the same purpose. It is also important to improve access to social benefits and services, which will help reduce social exclusion. To mitigate the effects of low birth rates and emigration, emigrating Lithuanians are encouraged to return to the country. It is desirable to keep in touch with emigrants so that they can preserve their identity, political, economic, and cultural ties with Lithuania. Lithuania has a general desire to create a family-friendly living environment.

In the past, the aim has been to provide the population with occupational and social security in line with EU requirements. A patient-centered healthcare system has been developed, which ensures fast access to medical care and good quality of service. The 2002 strategy also highlighted the fact that the support and security of social systems ensure more stable internal security. For example, a separate poverty reduction program was implemented. In order to keep the population active, the goal was to develop the labor market and increase employment.

Lithuania has specifically emphasized that the preservation of cultural heritage is a matter of national security. It is based on the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Heritage, according to which the loss of cultural heritage affects not only the loss of traditions but also directly socio-economic conditions. In this way, the unique national character of the Lithuanians is preserved, which would also enrich the world's cultural heritage. Therefore, economic, technological, and information tools promote societal creativity, while also fostering the full integration of European values into society.

TABLE 1. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE BALTIC LIVING ENVIRONMENT ¹

ESTONIA	LATVIA	LEEDU
raising the level of emergency preparedness	raising the level of emergency preparedness	improving emergency management and prevention
reducing the use of natural resources	improving emergency-related legislation	reducing pollution in the transport sector
prevention of the spread of environmentally hazardous substances	creating a form of cooperation that allows for the rapid exchange of information in emergency situations	introduction of energy-efficient and renewable energy
development of pollution prevention measures	improving crisis management and civil protection systems	development of technologies to combat environmental pollution
marine pollution monitoring	improving environmental legislation	implementation of air pollution standards
strict GMO requirements	improving preparedness for environmental disasters	implementation of international environmental requirements
waste reduction	forecasting of environmental disasters	Requiring Russia and Belarus to comply with nuclear agreements and requirements

¹ The measures presented in the table here and hereinafter are comprehensive and not comparable across countries.

EESTI	LÄTI	LITHUANIA
early radiation warning system	setting up an expert group on disaster recovery	monitoring of the environment around nuclear power plants
access to food, drinking water, vital services	alternative electricity supply for strategic objects	environmental monitoring of radioactive releases
the ability of residents to cope independently for a period of time	Improving civil-military cooperation	harmonization of regional development and development of coherence
development of civil defense		access to social benefits and services
developing an environmentally friendly mindset among the population		supporting the return of emigrants
surveillance of communicable diseases		patient-centered healthcare system
immunization plans		labor market development
		increasing employment
		preservation of cultural heritage

INTERNAL EMERGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION

An important part of **Estonia's** security policy is participation in crisis management and peace operations (Fundamentals of the Security Policy of the Republic of Estonia, 2004). To this end, the aim was to develop a crisis management system that includes military, legal and financial factors. Participation in international military operations and civilian missions is a good opportunity for the country to gain experience. At the same time, they are commitments to "contribute to strengthening security and stability in our immediate neighborhood and around the world". (Fundamentals of Security Policy, 2017)

In internal emergencies, the main task is to ensure the protection of the population. Namely, the state is of the opinion that emergencies can be prevented, and their consequences reduced in cooperation with the population, local governments, state agencies and the business and non-profit sector. (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010) The role of the state is to improve the information system of the population and to provide instructions for necessary behavior in emergency situations through communication means (see Table 2). All kinds of exercises have been thoroughly developed, involving as many participants as possible. The NSC of 2010 states that an up-to-date overview of the capacity to deal with the consequences of emergencies was being established. In addition, support has been provided for voluntary activities aimed at preventing hazards and addressing the initial manifestations of emergencies.

The operation of vital services is linked to emergencies. The state systematically analyzes the disruptions of important services and the threats that may cause the termination of services. As a preventive measure, public information campaigns are organized, and exercises involving as many stakeholders as possible are carried out. Good cooperation between the state and the private sector is important to ensure the continuity of services. For example, a large part of electronic communications networks, services provided, and critical information systems are privately owned (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010).

The country must be ready to manage the civilian crisis and provide development aid. Therefore, it is of primary importance for Estonia to participate in NATO and EU crisis management operations, the work of the NATO Response Force, and the EU Battlegroups. In development cooperation, Estonia supports, in accordance with its knowledge and resources, countries that promote a social order that accepts democratic and human rights. According to the NSC of 2017, action in the field of development aid and the

protection of human rights helps to create an environment that reduces the likelihood of conflict and increases security. Hence, the focus is on the prevention of international conflicts and crises, and as a result, an attempt is made to prevent their negative impact on both Estonia and its allies. Therefore, Estonia also supports the enlargement of the EU and NATO, as a result of which the Western value space will be strengthened both in Europe and around the world. For the same reason, Estonia supports good relations with all neighboring countries.

According to **Latvia's** 2019 document, the civil defense system and military cooperation must be developed and strong (see Table 2). This requires balanced inter-agency cooperation and the sharing of resources between them. In order for the Republic of Latvia to be able to deal effectively with different types of emergencies, it is important to increase the overall crisis management capacity. The responsible state authorities must systematically provide crisis management training to senior state officials in order to be prepared for various crisis situations. A critical indicator of national self-defense is the rapid and accurate recognition, assessment, and rapid decision-making of risk situations.

Special emphasis is placed on the development of civil-military cooperation. In order to ensure international security, it is also important for Latvia to participate in crisis management operations. In any case, there is a need for international cooperation, which also helps save resources. That is why there is close cooperation between the UN, the EU, NATO, and other national organizations and NGOs. Through an international organization (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe), Latvia has undertaken a separate task to stabilize the crisis in Ukraine and develop democratic and European values on the site (Latvia's National Security Concept, 2019).

According to the descriptions in the **Lithuanian** documents, an emergency is an event caused by a natural, technical, ecological, or social disaster. In addition, emergency situations are also outbreaks of communicable diseases that threaten to pose a major threat to the health and lives of the population. An emergency is also an event that threatens the environment, disrupts public administration or the functioning of critical infrastructure.

The strategy 2017 emphasizes the importance of civil defense. According to the strategy, it is necessary to develop and strengthen civil defense (see Table 2). It is considered necessary to increase the general knowledge of the population as to why their own self-defense capability is important. The protection of nationally important objects and institutions is also important, both during war and peace.

According to the strategy 2002, the main causes of emergencies were predominantly industrial and natural disasters, epidemics, and environmental threats. In order to ensure national crisis management, Lithuania was more generally involved in monitoring and setting up preventive measures. The aim was to increase the country's capacity to respond quickly to emergencies. According to the year 2019 document, strengthening civil defense is also important in Lithuania. The population must be prepared to defend itself during both peace and war.

Lithuania's main tools and measures to improve its crisis management and response capacity are to improve overall national capabilities. The 2019 document confirms that the preventive role of crisis management will be strengthened. To this end, a system for identifying dangerous situations and threats is being developed, and the possibility of prevention of their occurrence and development is being learned. In order to fulfill this task, the aim has been to establish civil safety and rescue authorities in accordance with international standards. They must be able to cope with crisis situations and meet the needs of society by providing immediate emergency assistance. In order to effectively prepare

for crisis prevention and respond appropriately to crises, institutions involved in crisis prevention and management will be further integrated into a common national crisis prevention and management system. This would allow for a rapid and effective response and cooperation with the respective systems of NATO, the EU and other countries.

TABLE 2. MEASURES FOR EMERGENCY SITUATION IN THE BALTIC STATES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
development of civil defense	development of civil defense	development of civil defense
crisis exercises	crisis management training	protection of important objects and institutions
improving information systems	international cooperation with the UN, NATO, EU, NGOs	strengthening the preventive role of crisis management
readiness to participate in civilian crisis management and development assistance	international crisis management operations	development of civil defense and rescue services
monitoring the performance of vital services	Stabilizing the crisis in Ukraine and developing Western values	development of a national crisis prevention and management system
public information campaigns	strengthening and developing civil-military cooperation	
encouraging voluntary activities to prevent risks		
Monitoring and protection of the operation of ICT services		

ECONOMIC SECURITY

Due to its small size and openness, the Estonian economy is heavily dependent on the development of the world economy. According to the NSC of 2004, "balanced development and transparency of economic relations and a stable inflow of foreign investment" are important for national security. Due to its strong integration into the world economy, the country is dependent on global economic crises and instability in foreign markets. A nationally important risk factor is the strong dependence on non-Estonian monopoly energy systems and suppliers.

The NSC 2010 describes the developments needed to ensure transport infrastructure, energy security, and the security of the financial system (see Table 3). Reconstruction or construction of ports, airports and the rail and road networks that are part of the European transport network are essential for the development of transport infrastructure. To this end, it is important to ensure public-private partnerships.

For Estonia's energy security, it is necessary to ensure the general security of supply and infrastructure security. Connecting to the energy networks of other EU Member States and diversifying energy sources are needed to become independent of energy monopolies. In order to reduce dependence on energy imports, it is essential to increase domestic energy efficiency. In addition, the NSC 2017 sets out the reliance on the European Union's strategy of maximizing the use and development of energy resources within the Union. For the distant future, Estonia plans to produce more electricity and heat from renewable sources.

According to the NSC 2010, the even regional development of the country affects economic, social, and environmental security throughout Estonia. The aim is to make the entire territory of the country livable and safe. The concentration of socio-economic and security risks in individual regions must be avoided. In order to ensure even regional development and settlement, the state organizes the development of the necessary infrastructure and the integrated management of the regional policy. It is important to ensure the quality and availability of security, education, health and other public services.

According to NSC 2017, the Estonian economy is supported by exports to stable markets. In addition, sound foreign investment and the ability of local companies to enter high-growth foreign markets are important. In order to protect the economy, "corruption, tax fraud, tax evasion and tax havens" are systematically combated. However, the country's economy must also be supported by a stable financial system. The necessary legal and supervisory measures will be put in place to prevent, resolve financial crises and mitigate their consequences. If necessary, financial resources will be allocated to ensure the regular operation of the system. It is also important to prevent difficulties related to the solvency of credit and other financial institutions. In the event of failures in payment and settlement systems, they need to be rectified quickly.

The NSCs of 2004 and 2010 confirmed that information and communication systems play important roles in society as vital services. Therefore, the state must have “a constant overview of the technical condition of the state's communication means and systems, the possibilities of duplication and safe operation in crisis situations. In order to secure transnational communications, international cooperation is needed to ensure the interoperability of electronic communications networks and to coordinate the use of resources.” (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010) The biggest change in the NSC 2017 is the introduction of electronic communications as a part of economic security, as it promotes the economy and increases its risk security.

According to Latvia's concept 2019, the country is characterized by limited access to raw materials and production resources (including financing and energy) and a small internal market. Given the openness of the economy and the orientation towards imports and exports, the country reacts quickly to international and regional economic processes. Economic development is also affected by the constantly declining active working population. The level of the informal economy remains high, thus negatively affecting the economic and investment environment and further increasing the vulnerability of domestic policies. Tax evasion is also a factor in society's negative attitude towards government policy. Changing this attitude is a long-term task between the taxes paid and the state's ability to invest more in defense, border security, road infrastructure, education, medicine, and social affairs. In the medium term, the Latvian economy will be affected by low economic growth in the euro area, the downturn in the Russian economy and trade restrictions. In the long run, strengthening economic security will require additional action in the European and North Atlantic markets, as well as in the fast-growing markets of Asia and Latin America.

The strategic goals of strengthening Latvia's economic security are to develop a stable and predictable economic environment, to promote economic growth, to diversify the external export market, to provide suppliers of alternative energy resources, and to diversify suppliers and types of cargo served. According to Latvian documents, the primary goal of economic development has been the development of a trans-European transport and energy network (see Table 3). One of the most important issues concerns energy security. The use of natural gas in Latvia continues to decline, but dependence on a single supplier has the potential to create political and economic pressure. In this way, energy prices and conditions can be manipulated, and delivery can be stopped if desired. Solving this problem requires close cooperation with other Baltic states as well as EU members. That is why the development of both northern (Estonia, Finland) and southern states (Lithuania, Poland) which would ensure greater energy security countries is important for Latvia. The longer-term goal is to become 100% independent of external electricity suppliers.

In order to ensure Latvia's economic security, it is important to develop information and communication technologies. In the state fiscal policy, it is important to reduce the state budget deficit and inflation. The production of high value-added goods is also encouraged. In order to ensure energy independence, energy supply must be diversified, and electricity connections developed. In addition, there is a need to systematically develop the country's overall infrastructure and defense systems. Emphasis is also placed on education by investing in systemic training of the workforce.

Latvia's economic development is most affected by the transit sector. It is very important for Latvia to balance the economic benefits of the sector. The potential risks involved could lead to a situation where the country becomes even more dependent on individual suppliers. The transit sector can also be used to create political and economic pressure on Latvia if goods transit through the country were to cease. This could lead to a loss of

income and an increase in unemployment in the sector. Emphasis is also placed on the development of the road network and railways both within the country and throughout the Baltics. This would ensure healthy competition between countries, which would require the three countries to develop joint logistics projects.

The Latvian authorities need to continue developing a balanced economy. Particular attention must be paid to combating the shadow economy and improving the taxation process. To this end, the risks of tax evasion must be systematically assessed, and appropriate control measures put in place. It is important to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies and institutions to prevent and fight corruption in order to identify, investigate and resolve financial crime and corporate schemes. It is also important to increase the efficiency of the judiciary system in order to achieve a faster resolution of cases. In order to prevent money laundering, the supervisory capacity of the financial sector needs to be improved.

Latvia must also support the introduction of energy-efficient, new, and environmentally friendly technologies and promote job creation. In this context, the use of local energy resources is very important, as it is a key factor in a country's economic growth.

Lithuania's strategy 2002 describes how, at that time, the country was highly dependent on one country's energy and strategic resources. The excessive share of foreign capital in the economy, which did not ensure stability and security in a free market economy, was also problematic. At the time, security was influenced by private sector control over sectors and objects of strategic importance to national security. Inequalities in social and economic development were growing, leading to growing disparities in living standards between different social groups. The decline in the living standards of social groups was accompanied by an increase in unemployment, which at the same time triggered social and political extremism and an increase in crime.

In order to ensure economic security, Lithuania has determined which strategic objects belong to the state on the basis of ownership and in which objects the participation of private or foreign capital is allowed, provided that the state retains controlling decision-making power. An individual domestic or foreign investor is not allowed to dominate one or more economic sectors of strategic importance. It is not possible to enter the national economy with capital of unknown origin.

The 2017 strategy focused on the implementation of macroeconomic policies aimed at fiscal and financial stability, sustainable economic growth, export diversification, and the prevention of financial and economic crises. Lithuania is cooperating with other countries to prevent money laundering, tax evasion (especially through offshore companies) and to change the financing of institutions, companies and organizations significant for the state while also expecting from them transparent financial discipline.

Throughout each strategy, it is mentioned that measures to ensure economic security, such as the creation of a favorable business environment, are encouraged, especially for the development and innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises, foreign investment, and export diversification (see Table 3). The state of Lithuania has attached great importance to measures designed to strengthen the country's economy. Such measures are aimed at creating the conditions for stable economic growth, ensuring a higher quality of life for Lithuanian citizens and increasing the competitiveness of the economy. Lithuania's main activities related to ensuring sustainable economic development have focused on smooth integration into the EU single market.

An important emphasis in the documents is on strengthening the domestic economy. To this end, stable fiscal policies and macroeconomic conditions are ensured at the national level. In order to stimulate economic development, the search for investments, and the creation of a favorable business environment are carried out at the national level. Special emphasis is placed on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, which in turn would help to ensure regional development. Export incentives have been created for entrepreneurs. Nationally important companies are required to secure their energy supplies. Like Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania aims to diversify its energy supply sources. An important difference compared to other Baltic countries is Lithuania's requirement to prepare the economy and transport infrastructure for extreme and critical conditions.

TABLE 3. MEASURES TO ENSURE ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE BALTIC STATES

ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
Developing European transport infrastructure	Developing European transport infrastructure	creating a favorable business environment
Joining EU energy networks	developing a European energy infrastructure	ensuring the conditions for macroeconomic stability
increasing domestic energy efficiency	ICT development	finding favorable investments for economic development
developing legal and supervisory measures for the financial system	developing legal and supervisory measures for the financial system	support for small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby supporting regional development
integrated regional policy	reducing government deficits and inflation	introduction of mandatory energy supplies
developing efficient domestic infrastructure	diversification of energy supply	diversification of energy supply sources
ensuring good access to public services throughout the country	developing efficient domestic infrastructure	preparing economic and transport infrastructure for critical conditions
reliable foreign investment	encouraging the production of goods with added value	export preferences
the fight against corruption, tax fraud, tax evasion, and tax havens	development of defense systems	joint Baltic logistics projects
ensuring the soundness of credit institutions' payment and settlement systems	workforce training	
an overview of the means of communication and the technical functioning of the systems	control over the shadow economy	
joint Baltic logistics projects	joint Baltic logistics projects	
	introduction of energy-efficient and environmentally friendly technologies	

SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

In the following, different approaches to similar topics in the Baltic states documents are presented by security areas.

ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION

For Estonia, like for other Baltic states, the fight against corruption and organized crime have a significant role (see Table 4). In addition to the obvious damage, corruption and organized crime also damage the country's image. The NSC 2010 confirms that tackling these types of crime will reduce the shadow economy and the spread of money laundering. Corruption is being prevented in both the public and private sectors, with a focus on raising public awareness. An important role is also played in developing the capacity to detect and investigate criminal offenses in law enforcement agencies.

According to the NSC 2010 2004, transnational organized crime is often closely linked to both terrorist organizations and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, these types of crimes threaten both Estonia's security and international stability. In 2004, the aim was to increase cooperation with Interpol and Europol, as well as with neighboring countries. It was also important to set up a witness protection system. Both the NSC 2010 and 2017 state that the goal of Estonia is

"... prevent the effects of transnational organized crime, prevent the generation of illicit proceeds and its legalization". Should the influence of international organized crime increase in society, it will threaten the security of the entire country. This leads to corruption and the infiltration of crime into politics, public administration, and the economy. Accession to the EU has led to the free movement of people, but as a result, the fight against organized crime needs more attention. Thus, Estonia, together with other EU member states, will continue to develop new solutions to combat these types of crime.

Latvia's National Security Policy Concept 2008 aimed to limit cross-border cooperation between organized crime groups and their efforts to influence Latvia's domestic economy. As organized crime is involved in the distribution of drugs and psychotropic substances, society is strongly encouraged to resist these offenses. Although corruption is mentioned in the Latvian document, it has not been thoroughly addressed. While corruption is treated as a separate issue in the Estonian and Lithuanian documents and mainly in the context of organized crime, Latvia deals with corruption in the context of the economic environment.

Lithuania's National Security Strategy for 2002 as well as for 2017 describes corruption as a phenomenon in the public, economical and private sectors that threatens every citizen, undermining their confidence in the rule of law and democracy. In addition, it reduces the willingness of foreign investors to invest in the country. Measures to be implemented to fight corruption will focus on increasing transparency and accountability in the public sector, disclosure of the legislative process and decisions, elimination of unnecessary regulations, investigation of corruption crimes and improving the means of imposing sanctions.

The main activities of organized crime with an international dimension are: trafficking in human beings, smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, trafficking in strategic goods, money laundering, illegal immigration, cybercrime and other similar crimes. The spread of organized crime into the national economy and financial sector poses a direct threat to public security and at the same time has a negative impact on the country's economy and political life. The main way to combat organized groupings is to develop cooperation with the EU Member States and increase the EU's external border surveillance capacity.

TABLE 4. MEASURES AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN THE BALTIC STATES

ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
raising public awareness of corruption	raising public awareness of organized crime	increasing public sector transparency
developing new technical solutions for the fight against organized crime		publication of decisions in legislative processes
increasing international professional cooperation		elimination of unnecessary regulations
development of a witness protection system		the fight against organized crime in cooperation with EU members
		Strengthening the EU's external border surveillance capacity

TERRORISM

According to Estonian threat assessments, the scope and coordination of the activities of terrorism and related criminal organizations have increased since 2004 (Fundamentals of the Security Policy of the Republic of Estonia, 2004). These phenomena are prevalent in areas where there is a lack or weakness of national security, law enforcement and the rule of law. Eliminating and mitigating the terrorist threat requires close and effective cooperation between NATO and EU member states. Estonia participates in the fulfillment of its commitments in accordance with its capabilities but does so consistently and supports all activities that prevent terrorism in any form and stop its spread (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010). Estonia complies with all "UN Security Council resolutions against terrorism and is a party to all major international counter-terrorism conventions". The aim is also to eliminate possible sources of financing for international terrorism and to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of terrorists. (Fundamentals of the Security Policy of the Republic of Estonia, 2004)

Particular attention needs to be paid to the prevention of radicalization, the prevention of terrorist financing, the prevention of the terrorist threat posed by chemical, biolog-

ical, radiological, nuclear, and explosive substances, and the protection of individuals and objects with a high risk of attack (see Table 5) (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010) However, the document of 2017 already describes the need to increase and strengthen the cohesion of society in order to counterbalance radicalization. The main measures for this are integration, adaptation, inclusion, strategic communication, and the psychological protection of the population.

In Latvia, the issue of migration and terrorism was reflected in more detail in the 2019 Security Concept. Thus, even the latest understandings and measures are represented in the Latvian document. According to the document, the main problem stems from the fact that, since the start of the Iraq-Syria war, 4,000 to 6,000 people have left Europe to fight in these areas. At the same time, it is emphasized that so far, no person, group or organization is known in Latvia that would want to organize terrorist attacks based on ideology. However, there are individuals who have expressed a desire to join the Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq. The main risks associated with joining Islamist groups are due to the fact that these people receive practical and ideological training in training camps. Such skills and knowledge can be used to plan a terrorist attack in the European countries of origin.

Thus, Latvia has instructed its responsible authorities to establish the necessary procedures for the profiling of refugees and asylum seekers (see Table 5). This makes it possible to prevent unsuitable persons (especially those coming from countries at risk of terrorism) from entering and staying in the Republic of Latvia. In addition, there must be an active exchange of information with other countries and their responsible institutions on refugee issues.

In order to prevent the threat of radicalization, the capacity of law enforcement agencies to identify threats of radicalization needs to be strengthened. These bodies need to work with NGOs to develop early warning systems and radicalization prevention mechanisms. It is also emphasized that, in the fight against terrorism, it is important to send representatives to crisis areas through NATO and the EU who can examine the response on the site. In addition, regional cooperation has a key role to play in harmonizing action plans in the event of a terrorist threat. However, society has a key role to play in these efforts. In order to reduce the risk of radicalization, it is very important to educate society - to promote the understanding that extremism is a serious threat to civil society and its unity, but also to the security of the state in general.

Lithuanian documents distinguish between political radicalization and extremism. Through them, coercion is used to achieve political or ideological goals. The goals can be social conflicts, incitement to ethnic discord and unrest, as well as the achievement of general power. Such ideologies are characterized by the dissemination of radical and hateful messages by illegal means, which often contain discriminatory views of certain groups in society.

The document of 2002 states that although the country is not usually a destination country for migration, the possibility of uncontrolled migration theoretically causes a number of security problems. Thus, it has also been considered important to participate in the fight against terrorism with the international community (see Table 5). At that time, the aim was also to develop legislation on terrorism, to combat terrorist financing, to strengthen counter-terrorism intelligence, and to be constantly prepared to deal with crisis situations caused by terrorist acts. The 2012 strategy already takes into account the possibility that Lithuania itself could be subjected to a terrorist attack. It is also possible that people who take part in international operations in either civilian or military

missions can be subject to attack. The 2017 strategy outlined the main measures against radicalization and terrorism, which are the detection of manifestations of radicalization and the improvement of the exchange of information between agencies.

TABLE 5. COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES OF THE BALTIC STATES

ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
prevention of terrorist financing	profiling system for refugees and asylum seekers	the fight against terrorist financing
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	the capacity of law enforcement agencies to detect radicalization	strengthening counter-terrorism intelligence
protection of persons and objects with a high risk of attack	assisting crisis areas through NATO and EU structures	readiness to deal with crisis situations arising from terrorist acts
increasing the unity and resilience of society	regional cooperation on terrorist threat action plans	detection of manifestation of radicalization
	raising public awareness of the dangers of radicalization	improving the exchange of information between agencies

POLICE AND BORDER GUARD

Estonia's security is based on the constitutional order and a functioning rule of law. According to the NSC 2017, insufficient internal security can lead to an increase in external security threats. Social security is strengthened by community cohesion, which is why more and more community members are involved in ensuring security (see Table 6). It is also important to pay attention to the development of a modern working environment for the agencies dealing with internal security and the motivation of their employees. In this way, more attention is also paid to modern information technology solutions and information security measures. Under the NSC 2010, compensatory measures are applied to prevent illegal migration and cross-border crime in the absence of permanent border controls at the internal borders of the Schengen area. Improving the surveillance of the European Union's external borders requires improving technical surveillance, introducing new electronic control measures, and changing the agencies (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2017). The surveillance of marine areas is ensured by the development of civil-military cooperation.

Latvia's concept of 2019 confirmed that state security institutions, law enforcement institutions, and border guards are directly responsible for the protection of the fundamental values established in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. These values include national independence, the democratic system, territorial integrity and national security. In the context of internal security, it is important that these bodies have a professional understanding of changes in the international environment and the overall impact of these changes on national security. The same authorities must be able to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to different types of emergencies, and their capacity must be further enhanced in the future.

According to Latvia's National Security Concept 2008, border guards have a key role to play in ensuring the country's independence and security. The Concept of 2019 states that the security and defense capability of the state border must be strengthened, as Latvia is the external border of both the EU and NATO and an immigration route. The main risks due to inadequate border controls are illegal border crossings and smuggling, illegal imports

of arms, drugs, and radioactive substances, and their further movement to the other EU Member States. In addition to migration, border controls play an important role in preventing epidemic and epizootic threats. In order to prevent the aforementioned risks, it is important that border guards cooperate with state authorities. The document of 2008 states that international cooperation to date has focused on reducing and preventing illegal migration. However, it then became clear that it was more effective to take measures to address the problems that cause migration in migrants' countries of origin.

Risk mitigation measures for the period starting in 2008 focused mainly on border management in Latvia. There was a need to modernize and improve the quality of immigration services by increasing the number of workers and raising the level of education. The lack of intra-EU border controls has necessitated the introduction of compensatory measures to control migration processes in the country and ensure the security of the external borders of the EU. In order to make border management more efficient, it is necessary to strengthen practical cooperation between the EU Member States, especially in the fight against cross-border organized crime. It is important to develop cooperation with third countries on migration and asylum. Latvia has paid special attention to the fight against trafficking in human beings and the prevention of trafficking in human beings.

In addition to increasing the capacity of the border guard, the police also need to be developed. The Concept of 2019 emphasizes the need to improve police operations and provide more effective training to ensure a rapid response to crises or major national threats. In order for police officers to have access to all residents of Latvia in the event of danger, it is important to continue cooperation between the police and society.

An important feature of the Concept of 2019 is the statement that a major threat to national security arises from local young Latvians who wish to participate in activities that are detrimental to Latvia's national interests. In order to limit such activities, in 2015, the Seimas passed amendments to the Criminal Code, which establish criminal liability for people for participating in an illegal armed conflict, financing armed conflict, as well as recruiting, training and sending weapons to the conflict area. It is particularly important to limit the participation of children and young people in military training camps in other countries.

Lithuania's National Security Strategy for 2017 aims to strengthen internal public security. To this end, effective inter-agency cooperation will be developed. The main threats of the new period are mainly due to organized crime, and therefore there is a greater emphasis on detecting them and preventing their activities. Organized crime is also a national threat when cooperating with foreign intelligence officers and terrorist groups.

It is considered important to ensure reliable protection of the external borders of the EU and to strengthen the prevention and control of illegal migration. There is a constant readiness to reintroduce temporary border controls with EU countries. Up-to-date training of relevant authorities is considered important in the fight against cross-border crime. This also requires constant cooperation between partner authorities of different countries and investment in modern technology.

TABLE 6. SECURITY MEASURES IN THE BALTIC STATES

ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
improving technical surveillance in border guard	ensuring the security and defense capability of the state border	developing and strengthening border control
introduction of new electronic control measures	modernization of immigration services	up-to-date training for officers handling cross-border crime
	internal control of migration processes	continuous cooperation between partner authorities in different countries
	Strengthening practical cooperation between EU members	investment in modern border control technology
	developing cooperation with third countries on migration and asylum	
	combating and preventing trafficking in human beings	
	supplement to the Criminal Code on participation in an illegal conflict	
	improving police training to deal with crisis situations	
	ensuring good communication between the police and the population	

SECURITY SERVICES

The purpose of the activities of the Estonian security services is to ensure national security and the maintenance of the constitutional order. To this end, security institutions are constantly being developed, and the role of prevention is being increased. Security agencies use non-military preventive tools, such as collecting and processing relevant information on hostile intelligence and influencing activities. The Security Police deals with the prevention of intelligence activities against the state, the protection of state secrets, and the fight against terrorism and corruption. The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service collects information on foreign countries, factors, and activities necessary for the state to formulate foreign, economic and defense policy. In addition, counterintelligence is carried out to protect the country's foreign missions and units of the Defense Forces located outside the territory of the state. Compliance with the requirements established for electronic information security is also coordinated and organized. (Fundamentals of the Security Policy of the Republic of Estonia, 2004; National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010)

Latvia's Concept 2008 states that the goal is to increase the capabilities of intelligence and counterintelligence and enhance cooperation between relevant agencies and partner countries. The Concept of 2019 provides a longer justification for the need to develop intelligence capabilities. Namely, the Concept states that the activities of foreign special services are one of the biggest threats to the wider national security. There can be threats to the political, economic, social, and military spheres. Due to its geopolitical specifics, the biggest challenge is Russia's special services, which collect material from the public information space and also implement so-called active measures to influence the decision-making processes of Latvia, NATO and the EU. For this purpose, the controlled persons are used in the mass media, state and local government institutions, as well as in the political, economic and business space. Virtual space and social networks are increasingly being used because they allow them to operate at a distance. The strategic goal of Latvia is to take preventive measures against special services so that their activities do not harm the interests of Latvia, the EU or NATO. To this end, Latvia's long-term priority is to systematically strengthen and develop the capacity of its security institutions (see Table 7). Great attention must be paid to staff selection and regular training, the introduction of new technologies and solutions, as well as the improvement of methods and the efficiency of daily operational and analytical work. Particular attention must be paid to identifying new intelligence tools to ensure the security of classified communications and communications of national importance. The physical facilities of the various public authorities must also be systematically inspected to make sure they meet for contemporary security requirements. The Latvian Security Police and other responsible authorities must continue to work systematically and purposefully to prevent the use of the temporary residence permit program for activities that threaten national security. At

the same time, persons who have already received a temporary residence permit must be monitored to check that their activities correspond to what is indicated in the application for a residence permit.

Lithuanian strategies mention on several occasions the problematic activities of Russia's special services. Their activities are characterized by the use of traditional and common methods as well as new technologies. Russia's special services use a variety of methods and technologies to gather information, make compromises and influence military capabilities, political processes, and other areas of socio-economic life. Lithuania confirms that the leakage of state secrets threatens not only security but also their international credibility. In order to prevent these threats, the strengthening and development of security and protection of state secrets is systematically pursued. Particular attention will be paid to background checks on people exposed to state secrets and sensitive information and communication technologies.

TABLE 7. PREVENTIVE MEASURES OF THE BALTIC SECURITY SERVICES

ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
development of security institutions	development of security institutions	development of security institutions
	increasing international cooperation between security services	strengthening the protection of state secrets
	identifying new intelligence tools	
	systematic verification of security compliance by public authorities	
	monitoring the lawful use of temporary residence permits	

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

When analyzing the documents of the Baltic states, it is necessary to take into account the difference that Latvia and Lithuania have also presented in their documents, the tasks of the military side of the state, and the planned solutions. Estonia has a separate national defense development plan for this purpose. This may have been the reason why many issues concerning internal security were not described in the Latvian and Lithuanian documents in the same depth as in Estonia. In addition, the specific features of the preparation of documents must be taken into account. The structure of Estonian documents is general, but clear. For example, when describing the security environment, a separate section is dedicated to each threat, which provides an adequate understanding of the topic. However, the peculiarity of Latvian documents is to use a narrative form and to thoroughly present the ideological views of the country. For example, the latest concept, the Concept of 2019, provides a thorough overview (approx. 2 pages) of the acts of Russia in the last decade and their impact on the general threat level in both Latvia and Europe in general. On the other hand, the Lithuanian documents present the threats and lines of action very briefly in the form of a list. Thus, the degree of generalization also varies greatly between countries. Thus, direct comparisons can be arbitrary, as some topics or threats to the security environment may be implicit in the text or expressed in the context of developments in other areas.

It is safe to say that there are security threats that are common throughout the Baltics. These include organized crime, corruption, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the intelligence of foreign special services. The threats may be documented by different periods. Namely, the vast majority of threats have been mentioned in the documents of each country for a different period, but have not been carried over to the next document for a reason known to the respective country.

The analysis of the documents also revealed the differences between the countries, on the basis of which more general proposals are made here.

ESTONIA

- Unlike other Baltic countries, only Estonia's document of 2004 on environmental protection mentioned monitoring the origin and use of GMOs.
- All the Baltic states attach importance to international security cooperation. Estonia is distinguished from others by the goal of finding solutions to international problems that would be useful for other countries as well.
- In the context of terrorism and radicalization, the psychological protection of society and strategic communication are important mitigation measures. In

essence, it is a concept of the resilience of the society, which is missing in the Latvian and Lithuanian documents as a comprehensive approach.

LATVIA

- ◆ Latvia has clearly set itself the goal of participating as actively as possible in the work of international organizations. This compensates for the small size of the country and enables it to participate in security policy decisions that are important for its country.
- ◆ Among the only Baltic states, Latvia is the only one that has considered it important to maintain very good relations between the population and law enforcement officials in order to ensure smooth mutual communication in crisis situations.
- ◆ It is considered important to stabilize the crisis in Ukraine and to help develop democratic values there.
- ◆ Latvia considers it important to invest in the training of a high-quality workforce. Estonian NSC 2004 mentioned its importance, but this issue is missing in later documents. Lithuanian documents do not address this issue, either. Given the importance of social stability and sustainability for each country, it is proposed that continuous modernization of the workforce be included as part of the country's security policy.

LITHUANIA

- ◆ It is extremely important for the country to connect all energy infrastructure to Europe.
- ◆ Due to its geographical location, Lithuania emphasizes the need to pay active attention to Belarus as well, as its problems include smuggling, socio-economic, and environmental instability. Considering that, apart from Russia, it is the closest non-Western country to both Estonia and Latvia, the activities there should be more important to us and supporting development there should be more important than at present.
- ◆ The difference in Lithuania is to limit the dominance of one domestic or foreign investor in a strategically important economic sector in order to ensure economic security.

COMMON RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BALTIC STATES

- ◆ Following the example of Lithuania, it can be recommended that Estonia and Latvia consider maintaining contact with immigrants to be of national importance. There are few people in the territory of the Baltic states², so citizens could be encouraged to return to the country. It is important to encourage immigrants to preserve their identity and also to maintain cultural ties with their home countries. The “Foreign Policy Development Plan 2030” refers to this, but in the context of security, the number of citizens and the preservation

² In Estonia ~ 1.33 million, in Latvia ~ 1.92 million, in Lithuania ~ 2.8 million.

of culture are also important, which is why it could also be mentioned in the NSC.

- ♦ It is important for Lithuania to participate in the Eastern Partnership program by developing cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Active participation in the Eastern Partnership program can also be recommended to the other Baltic states, which have both mentioned in general terms the importance of maintaining the Western world order. These views can be supported and their knowledge and skills offered to those interested.
- ♦ Following the example of Latvia, it can be recommended that Estonia and Lithuania express their support for Ukraine more clearly in future documents. Although the crisis in Ukraine began as early as in 2013, both Estonia and Lithuania have nothing short of neglected this in their strategies. As Russia's activities in Ukraine and the response of Europe to them are also important for Estonia and Lithuania, it is proposed that the stabilization of the crisis there be considered nationally important to us and, if possible, that ways be found to help stabilize or resolve the situation there.
- ♦ Following Latvia's example, it can be recommended that other Baltic states consider it important to develop national rapid response and medical support units to support international operations. The proposal is based on the assertion of Estonia and Lithuania that international cooperation and assistance to allies is an important part of national security.
- ♦ The special feature of Estonia is to protect human rights also in virtual space. Considering the growing connection of society with the virtual world, it can be recommended that other Baltic states pay special attention to the protection of human rights in the virtual space.
- ♦ Following Estonia's example, Latvia and Lithuania can be recommended to develop a concept of resilience for the psychological protection of society, which includes a number of security measures.

It is certain that each country has a lot to learn from each other's experiences and understandings. The overview here points out possible points of learning and development. Those interested in the security policy of the Baltic states can compare the various security problems of the countries, the measures planned to mitigate them, and draw conclusions based on them.

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ANNEX

ANNEX 1 FACTORS ENDANGERING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF ESTONIA³

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY POLICY 2004	FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY POLICY 2010	FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY POLICY 2017
terrorism	terrorism	terrorism
organized crime	organized crime	organized crime
economic threats	information technology threats (cyberattacks and information operations)	information technology threats (cyberattacks and information sessions, dependent e-residents)
social threats	instability in the global economic environment	economic threats
uncontrolled global developments and international crises	population growth, scarcity of resources	uneven regional development (including social inequalities)
-	exacerbation of regional crises	-
-	changing forms of cooperation - the declining power of the west	the power of the western value space is declining
-	asymmetric hazards	asymmetric hazards
threats from human activities and natural forces	a military attack against Estonia is unlikely	a military strike against Estonia cannot be ruled out, NATO's collective deterrence is needed to prevent it
military crises in the region	countries incapable of governance	natural disasters, environmental pollution, infectious diseases
intentional violation of the territory	competition for energy resources	proliferation of drugs
activities of special services	inadequate arms control, and disarmament	migration flows, i.e., the impact of migration
eriteenistuste tegevus		Russia's more active aggression
		political radicalization and polarization

³ The first half of the table is comparable across periods, showing the risk assessments carried forward.

ANNEX 2 THREATS TO THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF LATVIA

LATVIAN NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT 2008	LATVIAN NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT 2019
terrorism	hybrid threats by Russia :
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	economic sanctions
climate change	suspension of energy supply
environmental hazards	humanitarian interference
cyberterrorism	propaganda
intelligence activities on the territory of Latvia : political, economic and military intelligence	psychological influence
	cyber attacks
	aggressive agents of influence
	peace-crisis-war methodology
	Instability in the Middle East, a continuous growing threat :
	flood of migrants
	proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
	increase in terrorist threat
	alien fighter phenomenon
	terrorismiohu kasv
	võõrvõitleja fenomen

ANNEX 3 THREATS TO THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF LITHUANIA

LITHUANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002	LITHUANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2012	LITHUANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2017
organized crime terrorism, the spread of radical ideologies, religions, etc.	international organized crime international terrorism	organized crime terrorism, extremism, radicalization
corruption	corruption	corruption
social inequalities, social and economic disparities	uneven socio-economic development	social/regional isolation, poverty
economic dependence, unstable operation of critical infrastructure, energy dependence	economic vulnerability, economic and energy dependency	economic and energy security, economic dependence
demonstration of military capabilities near the border	Neighbouring country's demonstration of force in the region	conventional military threat
weapons of mass destruction	weapons of mass destruction	-
intelligence	-	civil and military intelligence
-	global and regional instability	regional and global instability
-	nuclear energy development in the region	unsafe nuclear projects
-	crisis situations (national, economic, social or technical)	emergencies at national and international levels
-	information attacks	information threats
-	cyberattacks	cyber threats
-	value crisis	value crisis
-	weakening of the Euro-Atlantic community	threat to the coherence of Euro-Atlantic cooperation
proliferation of weapons	divisive activities of foreign countries	demographic crisis
illegal immigration	long-term effects on the global economy and the financial crisis	
epidemics	the latent effects of climate change	
anti-globalization movements	crime and the informal economy	
industrial accidents	abolition / disclosure of state secrets	
proliferation of drugs	insufficient defense funding	
	political radicalization and extremism	
	deterioration of public health	

THE OVERVIEW PROVIDES THE POLICIES AND RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY, LISTED BY CATEGORY

To this end, the strategic documents of the security policy of the three Baltic states have been examined by way of thematic analysis: National Security Concept of Estonia (2004, 2010, 2017), Latvia's National Security Concept (2008, 2019) and Lithuania's National Security Strategy (2002, 2012, 2017). Further research and more detailed analyses can be made on the basis of this study.

The analysis of the documents is based on the lines of action set out in the "National Security Concept of Estonia". The threats identified in both Latvia and Lithuania and their mitigation measures were grouped under them. The overview is also structured according to the lines of action. The structure of the work has followed the principle that the chapter on a specific thematic area sets out the cross-cutting themes and main views of each country. The chapters do not have a uniform structure: while the pervasive topics of the documents could be categorised, the emphasis on specific themes varied from country to country. The analysis does not follow a strict time frame but rather provides a thematic overview.

